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FOREWORD: A METAPHOR

The emerging concern for corporate democracy, shareholder
governance and the current corporate environment requires a metaphor.
Chantal Delsol, a philosopher from France provides an eye-catching
viewpoint.
We breathe in an epoch in which Delsol suggests,
"[d]emocracy has become the sacred tabernacle of our time, and
discourse that accompanies its theology. The democratic system
tolerates no criticism. It carries in its wake the danger of intellectual
subjection, watchful and sure of its legitimacy. It knows no adversaries,
only enemies."'
It is also equally clear that concern for authority
requires perspective. The desire to eliminate hierarchical authority can
be tied to Nineteenth Century currents demanding that authority in its
chain-of-command sense be neutralized, with this neutralization
leading, inevitably, to a society of equals in which the distinctions
between the governors and the governed disappear. The elevation of
democracy and the evisceration of hierarchy represent "the concrete
manifestation of everything we believe in, that is, the liberty and wellbeing of the individual." 3 Nevertheless, "we have not [yet] found a
better or more efficient way to embody our humanism, which is based
on individual autonomy."4
Chantal Delsol's insights provide a
luminous metaphor for the ascendant movement that views shareholders
as sacred governors and directors as less than equal wardens of
corporate decision-making.
I. INTRODUCTION: SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND THE RISING TIDE
FAVORING GOVERNANCE REFORM

Against this background, board adoption of bylaw provisions,
corporate coordination designed to stack the board of directors or
stagger their terms possibly in combination with other takeover defenses
or otherwise to abbreviate or interfere with shareholder voting rights,5
1. CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD 93 (Robin Dick trans., 2003).

2. Id. at 20-21.

3. Id. at 93.
4. Id.
5. One particularly effective possibility of "other takeover defenses" is the adoption of a
poison pill coupled with a staggered board, which effectively provides the board with veto power.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L.
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have become a disputed feature of corporate law.6 On one account, the

shareholders' franchise is a tool of discipline that acts as a reliable
plinth "that legitimates the exercise of power [by corporate agents] over

vast aggregations of property that they do not own.",7 In conjunction

with this perspective, the customary conception of the business
judgment rule coupled with judicial deference to board decisions
appears inapt when directors-as putative agents-impair governance
Consistent with this
by shareholders, as presumed principals.8
acquiescence to "corporate democracy," 9 interference with the franchise
constitutes a possible breach of the board's fiduciary duties as well as a
Another view suggests that the
basis for exacting scrutiny.' °
shareholder vote is merely an unimportant formalism that acts as a
vestige or ritual of little practical importance," complimented by the
notion that accountability can best function in the hands of the board of
directors "as a separate institution independent from and superior to the

REV. 973, 976-77 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto] (arguing that
boards should not have veto power in takeover bids); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search For Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521,
561 (2002) (stating that "[n]either the finance literature nor the norms of corporate law support
vesting such unbalanced power in the hands of the board"); John C. Coates IV, Takeover
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,
passim (2000) (applying John Coates's observation that poison pill efficacy depends heavily on
the surrounding takeover defenses of the corporation). But see William J. Carney & Leonard A.
Silverstein, The Illusory Protectionsof the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 181 (2003)
(stating a "poison pill is only as good as the dilution of a bidder that it provides."). See generally
Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 887-951 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., The
Powerful Antitakover Force of Staggered Boards] (discussing the strength of staggered boards
prevalent in the majority of public companies in order to combat takeovers).
6. See, e.g., Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652-70 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(discussing whether a board acts consistently with its fiduciary duty when the board prevents or
impedes shareholders from expanding the board and electing new members); see also Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (explaining how the defendant, the target firm,
failed to meet its burden to sustain the Supermajority Bylaw under the standards of review in
Unocal or Blasius, and therefore, the Supermajority Bylaw was a preclusive, unjustified
impairment of defendant's stockholders' right to influence their company's policies through the
ballot box).
7. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
8. Id. at 659-60.
9. See, e.g., Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 321 (discussing the shareholder franchise and attempts
to thwart corporate democracy).
10. See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 ("Even finding the action taken was taken in good faith,
it constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to the
shareholders."); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at
*1, 23-31 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (discussing whether the applicable standard for analyzing the
claims should be judged under the Blasius standard or the Business Judgment Rule).
11. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
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firm's managers. ' 2 This is particularly true where outside and actually
independent directors receive all relevant information provided by

independent advisors. 3
As an elementary matter, boards can arguably retain power pursuant
to a Madisonian conception of corporate governance that allows
contracting parties to agree in advance via the corporate charter to allow
the board to entrench itself. 4 Indeed, it is intelligible on theoretical and

empirical grounds that shareholders might reasonably opt for board
entrenchment-implemented, for example, by means of a staggered
board-to enable a board to employ selling strategies more effectively
and thus to allow shareholders to earn a higher premium when the firm
is sold. 5 According to professors Kahan and Rock, "[s]uch a decision

is a kind of precommitment whereby shareholders, by binding
themselves ex ante, may be able to improve their collective position ex
post.' 6 Despite the persuasive appeal of this contractarian approach,
many doubts color the ongoing debate about whether boards should
retain the power to block unsolicited acquisition offers or whether
corporate action should principally reflect shareholder preferences
regarding hostile bids. 17 Consistent with one perspective, most states

"have control share acquisition statutes that make it practically
necessary for a bidder to win a vote in order to gain control."18 Another
12.

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 738 (2002) [hereinafter

BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS].

13. Id.
14. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Precommitmentand ManagerialIncentives: Corporate
Constitutionalism:Antitakeover CharterProvisionsas Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 473,
474-90 (2003); see also, HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 785 (1998)
("Most corporation laws are enabling statutes in the sense that they reflect the philosophy of
freedom of contract which has guided corporation law since the first truly modem general
incorporation laws were passed in the late nineteenth century.").
15. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 522.
16. Id.
17. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 974-76. See also Martin Lipton
& Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of CorporateGovernance: The QuinquennialElection of
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 224 (1991) (proposing that delegation of control of the
corporation be given to managers to allow them to make necessary long-term decisions).
18. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 976. Consistent with this
approach:
[I]n most states, boards may install and maintain poison pills that prevent an
acquisition. The power to maintain pills implies that a hostile bidder would be able to
gain control over incumbents' objections only if the bidder first won a ballot box
victory to replace the incumbents with directors that would redeem the pill.
Id. See also Stephen P. Dunn, "DirectorPrimacy": Why it May not Matter That Anti-takeover
Legislation Harms Shareholders and How Delaware Courts Have Gotten it Wrong (on file with
the author) (concentrating on Michigan's control acquisition statute and arguing that Blasius was
incorrectly decided).
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position, consistently with the deduction that "[c]ompanies like many
other complex assets, are almost always sold by negotiation," contends
that the "hostile tender offer ... has never been a major mode for
control transaction." Thus, "rational shareholders, aware of the full

range of agency costs, might commit to have their company sold

the board."19 This approach
through a negotiated process controlled by
2°
premiums.
leads to increased shareholder
' 21

shareholders
Flanked by "profound ambiguity toward the role of

22
and a blizzard of scholarly rethinking about corporate governance, the
lies at the
vital query, is, ultimately: "[w]ho decides?
' 23 This question
jurisprudence.
takeover
heart of corporate

Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 474. Evidently,
[m]ost of the commentary on hostile takeover falls in one of two broad schools of
thought. The Hamiltonian "board veto" school holds that shareholders are not wellequipped to make the decisions involved in the sale of the company and should thus
leave these decisions to the board .... The Jacksonian "shareholder choice" school
holds that boards are self-interested in responding to hostile bids and that shareholders
should independently determine whether to accept or reject an offer ... [yet,
paradoxically] [w]hen shareholders consent to rules that enshrine board power, they
call for legal intervention to set these rules aside.
Id. at 474-75.
20. Id. at 522.
21. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the ShareholderRole:
A "Sacred Space" in CorporateTakeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 261 (2001).
22. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in CorporationLaw, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (noting that legal academics view corporations as a web of
ongoing contracts and thus as contractual governance structures); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3-34 (2002) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts] (discussing how the chief criteria for
any model of the corporation should be the model's ability to predict formal governance
structures); Margaret M. Blair, Reforming CorporateGovernance: What History Can Teach Us, 1
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 1-4 (2004) (detailing the prevalent debates among scholars which has
raged due to hostile tender offers that took place in the 1980s); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused
Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 271-72,
279-302 (2004) (explaining that "the fundamental developments that destabilized our
contemporary corporate governance system were those that changed the incentives confronting
both senior executives and the corporation's outside gatekeepers"); Roberta S. Karmel, Should a
Duty to the Corporationbe Imposed on Institutional Shareholder?,Brooklyn Law Sch. Pub. Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11, 1, 24-30 (May 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=546642 (discussing the contractarian theory, team production theory
and director primacy approach which harkens back to managerialism); C. K. Prahalad, Corporate
Governance Or Corporate Value Added?: Rethinking the Primacy of Shareholder Value, 6 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40, 45-50 (1993) (suggesting a value-added conception of corporate
governance that rejects the archaic notion prevelent in the finance literature that the primary
market dicipline comes from the capital market); Thompson & Smith, supra note 21, at 261
(discussing the need to find a sacred space for shareholder self-help, free of directorial or judicial
intrusion).
23. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 792 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy in
19.
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Surrounding this question are two interconnected issues: authority

and accountability. Kenneth Arrow contends that "[accountability
machinery] must be capable of correcting errors but should not be such
as to destroy the genuine values of authority. 2 4 It is probable that we
cannot increase director accountability to shareholders, courts and
regulatory bodies without undermining their discretionary authority no
matter what drives our underlying theory of the firm.25 Therefore,

establishing the proper mix of discretion and accountability emerges as

the central corporate governance question. 26 Apparently, in the context
of the ongoing corporate governance reform debates, "the idea that
shareholders should be given more power and control rights relative to
directors and management is based on the premise that the principalagent problem is the most important governance problem to be
addressed in contemporary corporations. 2 7 Indeed, "[t]his premise has
been widely accepted by corporate legal scholars and is often assumed,
' 28
almost without discussion, in the debate about takeover policy.
Although board veto power might represent a serious impediment to
efficient corporate governance or, on the contrary, be necessary for
Corporate Takeovers]. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.
1988) (noting that takeovers raise the "issues of the [proper] allocation of authority as between
the board and shareholders"). For at least one answer to this question, see Bebchuk et al., The
Powerful Antitakover Force of Staggered Boards,supra note 5, at 890 ("[S]taggered boards make
it extremely difficult for a hostile bidder to gain control over the incumbents' objections.")
Bainbridge proposes an answer to the question that depends on context:
In statutory acquisitions, such as mergers or asset sales, the answer is clear, the target
corporation's board of directors decides. If the board rejects a proposed merger or
asset sale, the shareholders are neither invited to nor entitled to, pass on the merits of
that decision. Only if the target's board of directors approves the transaction are the
shareholders invited to ratify that decision. In nonstatutory acquisitions, such as tender
offers, the answer is more complicated. A bidder makes a tender offer directly to the
shareholders of the target corporation, thereby bypassing the board of directors....
[T]arget boards responded by developing defensive tactics designed to impede such
offers.
Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy in CorporateTakeovers, supra, at 792.
24. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974); see also Michael P.
Dooley, Two Models of CorporateGovernance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 464 (1992) (noting that the
values of authority and accountability are antithetical).
25. For a discussion of various theories of the firm, see Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of
the Firm, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 631-53 (1999), available at
http://encylo.findlaw.com/5610book.pdf.
26. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacyin CorporateTakeover, supra note 23, at 807.
27. Blair, supra note 22, at 30; see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for
FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028, 1041-43 (1982) [hereinafter
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers] (noting that negotiated
acquisitions are affected by management's abuse of its role as a bargaining agent for
shareholders).
28. Blair, supra note 22, at 30-31.
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effective corporate synchronization, 29 this debate takes place-most

notably-during anxious economic times.

One such example is the

decline of the stock market during the early part of this decade in

response to an informed understanding of illusory revenue growth
(premature revenue recognition)3 ° and imaginary profits, that have, at
times, been employed to finance hostile or friendly takeovers and that

had previously fueled speculative share-price valuations. In addition,
these developments have enriched speculators and gatekeepers who
control and largely benefit from the flow of information and
Together, this inescapably leads to increasing
misinformation.31
disparities in wealth and income distribution. Given this backdrop it is
likely that "the corporate scandals of the last few years have raised
serious questions about the quality and effectiveness of the governance
of U.S. corporations. 3 2 While "[t]he transactions and corporate
behavior that led to the demise of Enron, WorldCom, and others were

festering like an undetected carcinoma[,] [a]t the same time, in other
venues, there was a strong movement toward best practices in corporate
governance." " Because the speculative and explosive growth in
observable market capitalization that characterized the 1990's14 has

become burdened by the frisson supplied by an epidemic of corporate
accounting scandals, myriad financial irregularities and rampant rogue
managers, 35 accountability and consideration of the proper locus of
36
control have taken center stage.
Furthermore, misconduct, aided and abetted by negligent and
Corporate
29. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 974-75.
synchronization apparently refers to the optimal deployment of assets aimed at enhancing longrun profitability. Id.
30. Coffee, supra note 22, at 277. "During the 1990s, however, the nature of earnings
management changed, with managers shifting their focus from moderating earnings swings to
advancing the moment of revenue recognition. Accounting sandals rose commensurate with this
shift toward premature recognition." Id. at 276-77.
31. Gil Staffend has suggested this observation. The meaning of the term "gatekeeper" is not
necessarily self-evident. On one account, the "term refers to intermediaries who provide
verification and certification services to investors." Coffee, supra note 22, at 279.
32. Blair, supra note 22, at 2.
33. E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of CorporateGovernance Issues, Director
Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions,Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1008 (2003) [hereinafter Veasey, Dynamics of CorporateGovernance].
34. See, e.g., id. at 1008 ("In the 1990s, while the economy and securities markets were on the
ascendancy, there was a huge paradox developing.").
35. Coffee, supra note 22, at 270.
36. Jeffrey R. Boles, Book Note, Corporate Reform: The Locus of Control, 1 BERKLEY BUS.
L.J. 175, 175-78 (2004) (reviewing CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS (Christopher L. Culp &

William A. Niskanen eds., 2003)).
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inattentive boards of directors, 37 may have breached a once-confident
system of governance."
It is possible that misaligned incentives
coupled with conglomerate mergers aimed at self-interested ends have
mitigated the impact of the business cycle, generated greater cash

income for managers, and reduced the risk of corporate control contests
as well as the likelihood of shareholder activism.39 Taken together,
these events--on one account--diminish shareholder monitoring 4
while highlighting deficiencies in corporate coordination designed to
ensure the proper discipline of corporate agents. These corporate
governance deficiencies correlate directly, (if only partially), to the
"takeover movement and the growing use of equity compensation. ''4 A

related viewpoint contends that the "most reliable evidence, when
properly read, suggests that Enron and related scandals were neither
,,42
unique nor idiosyncratic.
These scandals are traceable to "pervasive43
problems ... that undercut existing systems of corporate governance.

On the other hand, if one regards "legal separateness as the singular
accomplishment of corporate law"" and if one is drawn to the plausible

conclusion that an important feature of the corporate form is that it
helps to solve the 'team production' problem through the delegation to

37. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22, at 270 (discussing who is to blame for contemporary
scandals).
38. Id. at 272.
39. Id. at 272-73.
40. Evidently, according to one commentator, shareholder activism and monitoring may or
may not have the potential to constrain agency costs within the firm. "Acknowledging the
rational apathy phenomenon would largely preclude small individual shareholders from playing
an active role in corporate governance ... scholars focused their attention on institutional
investors ... [whose] greater access to firm information, coupled with their concentrated voting
power, will enable them to more actively monitor the firm's performance ... " BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 514-15 (giving examples of sources in
which academics argued that shareholder activism could become an important constraint on
agency costs). For a perspective on the benefits of shareholder activism, see MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994) (stating that even if the United States modeled its system of corporate
governance on that of Germany or Japan, it would still not succeed, as there will always be
problems until stockholders have more power). For a more skeptical analysis, see BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 514 n.6, and Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671 (1995) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance] (discussing the various ways that
shareholders have for constraining managers which include shareholder derivative suits,
mandatory disclosure, and anti-fraud laws).
41. Coffee, supra note 22, at 275 (noting that other factors that have contributed to the
destabilization in corporate governance include institutional investors and Congress).
42. Id. at 270.
43. Id.
44. Blair, supra note 22, at 13.
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the board of directors of control rights,45 then efforts aimed at
strengthening shareholder power either driven by the impudence of
scandal or the exigencies of a takeover contest may undermine one
particular advantage of the corporate form: "the corporate form of
organization, more than any other form facilitates the locking-in46 of
of time."
invested capital for an extended--even indefinite-period
Governance often signifies accountability and discipline, but, "[l]ike
47
Conflation
much of life, corporate governance is about control.
yet
interconnected,
these
for
possibility
distinct
and
a
real
becomes
principal"the
correlatively,
and
separable, concepts. Additionally
agent approach ... often conflates the roles of directors and
managers. 48 Initiatives that might increase accountability and protect
the right of shareholders to exercise ultimate control of the corporate
enterprise 49 compliment the recent scandals. Like some schemes within
the takeover arena, these proposals are unlikely to acknowledge any role
for boards of directors in addressing actual principal-agent problems by
"monitoring managers to be sure that they are not self-dealing, and that
their actions are directed toward long-run wealth creation by the
5°
corporation rather than get-rich-quick schemes by management itself."
51 alone
Since accountability (including shareholder voting rights)
provides an inadequate normative account of corporate law,
accountability intensification strategies may stubbornly deflect attention
from "[a] fully specified account of corporate law ... [which] must
incorporate the value of authority, 52 even if authority remains a very
fragile concept from a formal point of view.53 A more fully specified
account suggests that shareholders lack authority, and, except under
very limited circumstances, they should. Nevertheless, the hint of
scandal coupled with various efforts designed to weaken takeover
45. Id. (defining the team production problem as when participants attempt to exercise too
much control through delegation).
46. Id. at 27.
47. Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law,
29 J. CORP. L. 103, 103 (2003) [hereinafter Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control].
48. Blair, supra note 22, at 42.
49. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (suggesting that a growing consensus supports the view that
shareholders should exercise ultimate control over the corporation).
50. Blair, supra note 22, at 42.
51. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 23, at 805
(explaining as thus understood, shareholder voting rights are not necessarily part of the firm's
decision-making system but possibly one of many accountability tools).
52. Bainbridge, The Board of Directorsas Nexus of Contracts,supra note 22, at 7.
53. Thomas Marschak, Organization Theory, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION,
INFORMATION AND MARKETS 223, 229 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
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or alternatively to enhance shareholders' exit options, thus

providing more direct control over corporate assets, 5 destabilizes this
conclusion by implying that corporate law should vest authority among
shareholders or with the courts.

One account suggests that takeovers exist at the intersection of board

and shareholder control.56 The meaning of that claim is currently
unclear but if true, suggests that judicial intervention is necessary to
police this contestable space largely reserved for the residual
claimants-the shareholders.57
However, a dominant, if easily
challenged argument againstjudicial intervention and enhanced judicial
scrutiny (designed to protect shareholders) during a control contest is
that since boards have power over other corporate decisions and since
this "arrangement is commonly viewed as working well," the
vindication of board power in a takeover context is expected to be
beneficial as well.58 The persistence of scandal gravely wounds this
claim by implying that the reverse may be true despite some resistance
by courts aimed at allowing takeover jurisprudence to expand into other
areas of governance and thus undermine all statutory directorial
prerogatives.59
A number of courts, perhaps goaded by the pungency of current
6°
61
scandals,
statutory
initiatives,
or as part
of their
pre-existingcorrective
adherence federal
to judicial
supervision
of corporate
governance
54. For a catalog of such efforts that cite proposals requiring corporate manager to remain
passive in the face of a takeover bid, and precluding directors from frustrating takeover bids, see
Blair, supra note 22, at 33-36.
55. For a catalog of such efforts that cite proposals that would among other things give
shareholders the power to initiate mergers or dissolution, see Blair supranote 22, at 36-38.
56. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 131.
57. See id. at 122 ("Agreeing with Thompson and Smith's model and its normative push to
expand shareholder choice in the takeover context.").
58. See Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 977-78 (dismissing this
justification).
59. E. Norman Veasey, D. Block, N. Barton and S. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule:
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 573, 577 (1990) (book review)
[hereinafter Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule].
60. See Kurt M. Heyman & Christal Lint, Recent Developments in Corporate Law: Recent
Supreme Court Reversals and the Role of Equity in CorporateJurisprudence,6 DEL. L. REV. 451
(2003) ("These reversals have already been the subject of considerable commentary, and some
commentators have proclaimed them to be harbingers of a new 'post-Enron era' in which
Delaware courts will scrutinize the action of corporate directors more closely.").
61. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 917 (2003) (arguing that "[p]ressured
by a parade of accounting and corporate governance scandals from Enron Corp. to WorldCom
Inc. ... Congress possessed that rare political and institutional capacity to address deep causes
and systemic dysfunction. Congress used this episodic power opportunity to pass the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002").
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that ratifies shareholder primacy, are now circumspectly analyzing any
alleged interference with shareholders' putative rights to acquiesce in or
control certain challenged conduct. 62 This is irrespective of whether
scandal or board inattention has been broached directly or is grounded
in the suspicion that boards are largely animated by their own selfinterest. 63 Enhanced scrutiny by the judiciary originates, at least
partially, in the claim that shareholders are principals and that boards
act as agents. 64 This theory is animated, in part, by the assertion that the
shareholder franchise supplies the ideological underpinning upon which
65
the legitimacy of directorial power rests and is propelled by the
conclusion that agency costs can be minimized by both shareholder
66
governance and judicial suspicions designed to ferret out structural or
62. See, e.g., In re The MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 (Del. 2004)
("[I]n the context of the election of directors, conduct ... 'designed principally to interfere with
the effectiveness of a [shareholder] vote,' even if that action is taken in good faith, honestly, and
competently, is not action that may 'be left to the [board's] business judgment."' (citing Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988))); MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio,
Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 112-22 (Del. 2003) (discussing whether the director defendants manipulated
the size and composition of the Liquid Audio board during a contested election primarily to
interfere with MM's ability to gain new directorships).
63. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1127-28.
64. See, e.g., Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1128 (noting "[aiction designed principally to
interfere with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board and
shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action involves a determination of the legal and
equitable obligations of an agent towards his principal.").
65. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988). But see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of CorporateGovernance, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 547, 547-49 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance] (describing different classifications of the firm and their insights into
internal governance systems); Lynn A. Stout, Investors' Choices: The Shareholder as Ulysses:
Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public CorporationsTolerate Board Governance,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) [hereinafter Stout, Investors Choices] (stating that "[t]he end
result is a system of public corporate governance that has been aptly described as 'director
primacy' instead of 'shareholder primacy"'); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 847-50
(2002) [hereinafter Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth?] (arguing
that a successful corporation is built on more than shareholders alone-modern corporate
production is a form of team production). Another alternative corporate governance model
consists of the social responsibility approach. For a perspective on claims that the corporate
social responsibility model which implies that "directors and mangers of large, publicly held
corporations should have a legal duty ... to take into account not only the needs of the
shareholders but also other groups affected by the corporations' actions, such as its employees,
customers, or the communities in which they are based," see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 77, 78, 80-81 (2002). Wells suggests that corporate responsibility is about four
things: (1) big business; (2) reform of corporate power, not its elimination; (3) challenging the
notion of shareholder primacy; and (4) an unchanging solution to ever-new problems. Id. at 8081.
66. For an examination of this possibility in a derivative suit context see, James D. Cox &
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actual bias on the part of either the board or with respect to the officers

whom the board selects.
These various animating forces may
potentially serve as part of a contemporary effort to restructure the
business judgment rule.
Following along a divergent, but
unsystematically related path, much critical corporate law commentary

reflects an attachment to the precatory promise of "new" approaches to
corporate social responsibility. This has created a struggle to link
progressive corporate law with progressive social movements.67 Such
Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundationsand Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84-87 (1985) (stating that directors
edit the decision choices posed by a derivative suit in a manner which precludes consideration of
the suit's favorable effects); Harry G. Hutchison, Presumptive Business Judgment, Substantive
Good Faith, Litigation Control: Vindicating the Socioeconomic Meaning of Harhen v. Brown, 26
J. CORP. L. 285, 341 (2000) ("Social-psychological mechanisms may generate bias in directors'
assessment of the shareholder's derivative action."). The social-psychological mechanisms that
may generate bias in directors' assessments include:
(1) 'the independent directors' prior associations with the defendants, and their
common cultural and social heritages; (2) 'biases established by appointment of
members to the board or special litigation committee;' and (3) 'control of pecuniary or
non-pecuniary rewards made available to the independent directors by the defendant
members of the board of directors.
Hutchison, Presumptive Business Judgment, supra, at 341 (citations omitted). Such an approach
is not necessarily or always incompatible with director primacy but may broaden the
circumstances for non-deferential judicial review (where the court refused to deploy the business
judgment rule) by broadening the conception of conflict of interest to include structural as well as
actual bias. It seems likely that the business judgment rule has no, or at most limited application
where the board of directors is disabled by a strong conflict of interest because in such cases
concern for director accountability trumps protection of the board's discretionary authority. This
seems true whether one is committed to shareholder or director primacy. See, e.g., Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra note 65, at 603-04
(noting how the business judgment rule prevents a shift in the locus of decision-making authority
from directors to the judiciary). While I retain some enthusiasm for the consideration of agency
costs within the context of derivative litigation, I am now persuaded that it is nonetheless possible
that a concern for agency costs carries with it the assumption that the firm is a thing that is
capable of being owned and with it a presumption that the putative owners (shareholders) are
entitled to manage their firm by overriding, when they deem it necessary, the decisions taken by
their presumed agents. Bainbridge suggests this view is possibly in error on several grounds. Not
least because:
Agency costs analysis ...applies only imperfectly to the modern public corporation.
To be clear, the claim is not that agency cost models are irrelevant to understanding the
public corporation. Rather, the claim is only that such models are incomplete. Agency
costs are the inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the
residual claimant.
Corporate law could eliminate agency costs by eliminating
discretion. In light of the law's failure to do so, it seems reasonable to assume that
accountability is not the only norm valued in corporate law. The director primacy
theory in fact explains that corporate law values both authority and accountability.
Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means andEnds of CorporateGovernance, supra note 65, at
568.
67. Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements,
76 TUL. L. REv. 1227, 1228-52 (2002).
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efforts are self-assuredly viewed as a counterweight to corporate
officers and directors who have "lived in a ceaseless anxiety that drove
them to expand their empires ruthlessly [while] ordinary citizens lived
."" Ceaseless anxiety, a fortiori,
in ceaseless fear of being fired ....
impels corporations to disregard the needs and concerns of both
shareholder and non-shareholder stakeholders. If this largely imitative
claim is correct, 69 it may apply within and outside of the takeover arena,
and serves as a basis for restricting the power of directors by enhancing
the power and control of shareholders and the potential and actual
power of outside regulators and judges. If accepted, these various
contentions undermine the conclusion that the corporate form properly
"places control rights over the assets of the firm in the hands of a board
of directors., 70 These various contentions may stem from a concern for
agency costs.
While agency costs can pose difficulties, and the "corporate scandals
of the last few years have made it clear that agency problems in
corporations can be severe, ' 7' it remains doubtful that all governance
reform proposals would necessarily have prevented "the frauds that
happened at Enron or WorldCom, or the insider dealing at Tyco, or
even the errors in business judgment that might have been behind Time
Warner's merger with AOL. 7 2 Nonetheless, whatever the merits of
these proposals, counter-proposals, claims, and counter-claims, it is
probable that these developments underline the inapplicability of the
standard economic approach to principal-agent relationships in a
corporate setting. The standard approach is "based on the assumption
that what action the 'principal' wished his agent to perform was
perfectly known, and the action could be perfectly and costlessly

68. Ellen Byers, Corporations,Contractsand the Misguiding Contradictionsof Conservatism,
34 SETON HALL L. REv. 921, 921 (2004) (advocating against deregulation of industry and noting
regulation allows industry to better advance the public interest).
69. See, e.g., JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 154 (John Wilkinson trans.,
1964) (stating that the concentration of enterprise arises because of a necessary concentration of
capital which on the whole leads to evil human and social effects and workers are scarcely in a
position to act in a distinctively human way). Progressive alternatives in the form of government
regulation are unlikely to eliminate such evil. Given the need to accumulate capital the only real

alternatives to an economy of corporations are a state economy or a heavily regulated statist

economy-both of which are just as likely to inflict evil. See, e.g., id. at 154-55 (contending that
an economy based on individual enterprises is untenable in the absence of technical regression
that leads inevitably to a society comprised of either large corporations or to a state economy.
The human and social effects of this concentration are largely evil).
70. Blair, supra note 22, at 27.
71. id. at 39.
72. Id.
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monitored. 73 Neither assumption seems credible in a world in which
shareholders are purportedly-but not necessarily-principals, while
directors act hypothetically-but not always necessarily-as their
agents. 74 My intuition is not that directors fail to act on behalf of

shareholders when and if fiduciary duty principles require. They do and
corporate law so requires such obedience. What is in dispute is whether
directors act or should act under the control of, or subject to the control
of the shareholders. This issue comes into focus when the board

responds to hostile takeover attempts by acting to either impair
shareholder voting or shareholder power while purportedly defending
corporate policy.
In addition to legitimacy, discipline, and formalism, shareholder

voting highlights issues of control.75 Reification of the shareholder

franchise as having "independent normative significance, ,,76 provides an

opportunity to conflate the necessity of accountability with the

indispensable verve of authority over long-lived assets.77 Sparked
largely by this debate and recent case law, I draw a distinction between
accountability concerns and authority requirements coupled with a
consideration of the proper locus of both as a vehicle to further examine

this issue. Furthermore, disparate conceptions of the business judgment
rule serve as a vehicle to clarify this debate.

Part II first examines (A) the emerging case for restricting the

discretion of directors grounded in shareholder or judicially-based
accountability concerns, which may imply shareholder control-either
within or outside of the takeover context;71 (B) alternative models of

corporate governance; 79 and (C) the inauguration of the courts' focus on
73. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION,
INFORMATION AND MARKETS 966-67 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
74. To be sure, if the directors borrow, issue stock and otherwise raise capital this may give
riseto some version of principal-agent grounded in the notion that a credit relationship exists
because "[s]o long as there is some probability of default, which can be affected by the actions of
the borrower [director/incorporator] there is a moral hazardor principal-agentproblem (provided
that that action cannot be perfectly monitored by the lender)." Id. at 967. For a discussion of
separation of ownership and control as the starting point for the principal-agent model of the firm,
see Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 109-12.
75. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
76. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 727.
77. The meaning of long-lived assets may not be immediately apparent. See, e.g., Blair supra
note 22, at 26-32 (noting that as understood, here, the reference is the necessity of locking in
capital for relatively long periods of time necessary for maximizing productivity and wealth
creation).
78. See infra Part H1(showing how a lack of boardroom restraint can lead to corporate
takeover attempts).
79. See infra Part H.A (explaining the shareholder primacy, managerial primacy, director
primacy and social responsibility models for corporate governance).
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board infringement of the shareholder franchise as a basis for
constraining board authority.8 ° Part III examines the evolution of the
Unocal, Revlon, and Blasius framework before inspecting more recent

claims suggesting the necessity of intense judicial intervention when the

board of directors infringe upon the shareholder franchise.8 ' Treading

through this gauntlet, it may be important to distinguish board action
that is grounded in the corporate charter (i.e. charter amendments) and
board action accomplished through bylaw amendments.8 2

The real question is whether Blasius adds anything in the context of a
takeover battle even if recent dicta suggests that outside of a contest for
83
control, Blasius supplies an independent standard of review that
constrains directorial discretion. Before Blasius, the Supreme Court of

Delaware stated that when a derivative suit, for instance, was brought
challenging the board's conduct in the midst of a takeover battle "it
[was] the plaintiff's burden to allege with particularity that the improper

motive in a given set of circumstances, i.e., perpetuation of self in office

or otherwise in control, was the sole or primary purpose of the
80. See infra Part 11.B (discussing the roles courts have played in developing boardroom
activities).
81. See infra Part III (expounding upon Unocal,Revlon, and Blasius).
82. This is so because (A) "[w]hen directors unilaterally adopt bylaws in response to a control
threat, the response will be subject to [Unocal] analysis... [and] possibly also a [Blasius]
analysis" and (B) "[bly contrast, when the board and the shareholders bilaterally adopt a
defensive charter provision, neither Unocal nor Blasius scrutiny [seems to apply]." Kahan &
Rock, supra note 14, at 499. Additionally, claims calculated to defend the franchise are often
riveted by fears of insufficient accountability including those related to the fiduciary obligations
of loyalty, good faith and care. Fretfulness about the shareholder franchise requires positioning
along a continuum between accountability and authority as part of the interplay between Blasius
and Unocal. It has been maintained that before Blasius:
[T]here were two [related] 'intermediate' standards of review: Unocal and Revlon.
Blasius and its progeny, building upon Schnell v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc., appeared
to add a third, namely, that board action taken 'for the primary purpose of thwarting
the exercise of a shareholder vote,' . .. will not be upheld unless the board can show a
'compelling justification' for its action."
William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware CorporationLaw, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 885-86 (2001) [hereinafter Allen et al.,
Function Over Form]; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(holding that the board may not use the corporate machinery for purposes of obstructing
legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders to commence a proxy context against management);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) ("However, where, as here,
no shareholder is presently engaged in a proxy battle, and the alleged manipulation of corporate
machinery does not directly prohibit proxy contests, such an action must be brought derivatively
on behalf of the corporation").
83. See, e.g., MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003) (noting
that "the same circumstances must be extant before the Blasius compelling justification enhanced
standard of judicial review is required to sustain a board's action either independently, in the
absence of a hostile contest for control or within the Unocal standard of review when the board's
action is taken as a defensive measure").
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By contrast, in Blasius (a non-derivative case),

despite evidence demonstrating that the board acted in good faith
consistent with its duty of care, 85 and without being selfishly motivated

by a desire to retain power,86 while concurrently being motivated to

defend corporate policy, 8 7 the defendant board retained the burden but

failed to show a compelling justification for its alleged interference with
the shareholder franchise. Subsequent cases confirm that the Blasius
framework presents its own difficulties, including the possibility that

the language that cabins the Blasius standard may serve as a basis to
demolish a reasoned conception of the business judgment rule that
envisions directorial authority as the correct solution to the problem of

creating, managing, and monitoring a public corporation."
Thus, Part IV reconsiders the Blasius approach with an eye toward
recent decisions and in light of a 2004 article authored by two

chancellors and one former chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery. 9 As part of their reassessment of Blasius, the chancellors
characterize the application of Blasius alongside Unocat ° as
functionally unhelpful and unnecessary. 9 This perspective suggests
"that the relationship between Blasius and Unocal/Unitrindoctrines is a
fruitful subject for some doctrinal pruning. 92 Although the case law
indicates that the board can neither completely block shareholders from
receiving tender offers, 93 nor halt all proxy contests, 94 the compelling
84. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
85. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
86. Id. at 658.
87. See id. at 657 (finding that the board was apparently motivated to avoid a severe drain on
operating cash flow, the desire to service its long-term debt, and to maintain the value of Atlas'
common stock).
88. See, e.g., Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, 1,
26-27 (declining to apply deferential business judgment review or examine the decision to
adjourn the annual meeting without closing the polls and instead used Blasius as a basis for the
court's substitution of its own decision-making for that of the directors). See also infra Part III
(discussing State of Wisconsin v. Peerless).
89. See infra Part IV (discussing Liquid Audio and other recent voting rights cases); see also
Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 884-95 (suggesting that the problem with the
Blasius standard of review of one of practicality, not principle because as later applied the Blasius
doctrine evolved into a flexible standard that operates much like the Unocal/Unitrinstandard with
a strong emphasis on the protection of the shareholder franchise which leads to results that fail to
differ substantially from Unocal/Unitrinreview standing alone).
90. Raymond J. DiCamillo & Evan 0. Wiliford, Liquid Audio: A Reaffirmation of the Blasius
Standard of Review 1, 7 n.26 (2004), available at http://www.rlf.com/articles/rec-art_3-090454

.pdf.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 884.
Id.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONOMICS, supra note 12, at 683.
Id. at 683 n.9.
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justification criterion, recently revitalized by MM Companies, Inc. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc.,95 "raises questions pertaining to whether, and to
what extent, Delaware courts will [also] apply the stringent Blasius
standard of review where the actual ability to obtain control is not
thwarted but where the challenged action merely dilutes the 'substantial
presence' of an insurgent on that board., 96 One could argue that
permitting the dilution of the influence of a potentially hostile bidder,
congruent with the teaching of Paramount Communications v. Time
Inc.,97 is consistent with the assumption that directors should retain
discretionary control of a hierarchy that comes in the corporate form.
By contrast, Liquid Audio apparently "presents a paragon of when the
compelling justification standard of Blasius must be applied within
Unocal's requirement that any defensive measure be proportionate and
reasonable in relation to the threat posed."9' The case implicates two
contrasting conceptions of corporate governance: (A) that the "power of
managing the corporate enterprise is vested in the shareholders' duly
elected board representatives";99 and (B) that shareholders as principals
are not simply captives of the business judgment of directors who
purportedly act as their agents;'0° hence, authority remains firmly in the
Additionally, this case involves another
hands of stockholders.
"'defining tension' in corporate governance today . .. 'the tension
between deference to directors' decisions and the scope of judicial
review.'"l1
Part V applies director primacy analysis to criticize the courts and the
predisposition of commentators to favor shareholder governance by
exposing their opinions to the implications derived from the two
principal alternative approaches to corporate governance-authority and
accountability. 10 2 Favoring the authority model that inevitably promotes
director primacy, I contend shareholder choice may have little
independent normative significance and that the appropriate, but
necessarily limited, question is whether a board's decision foreclosing

95. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
96. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 1.
97. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (applying
Unocal where there was arguably no change in control despite the possibility that Paramount's
rejected offer was superior).
98. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1131.
99. Id. at 1126.
100. Id. at 1128.
101. Id. at 1127.
102. See infra Part V (advocating an accountability/authority paradigm to shareholder voting
rights in relation to corporate governance).
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shareholder choice was based on proper or improper motives. °3 In
other words, did the board exercise its prerogative in ways that suggest
that the transaction was driven by management self-interest?' °4 Or, on

the other hand, was the board properly motivated in its justifiable
exercise of fiat?
II. SHOULD DIRECTOR DISCRETION BE RESTRICTED FURTHER?

As an initial matter, the fiduciary duty of directors has evolved as a

rather protean concept that can be broken down into at least three

categories. 5 The first category involves claims that directors did not act
with requisite care. 10 6 In Delaware, at least, such claims before the
1980's received little or no notice.10 7 Instead, directors were presumed
(with little chance of rebuttal) to have behaved as reasonable persons
would.'08 Hence, "instances of apparent director negligence triggered an
inquiry into whether a breach of the duty of loyalty had occurred,
thereby rendering the duty of care essentially unenforceable as a standalone concept."' 9 Nevertheless, in the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom," °

"the duty of care emerged in Delaware as an independently enforceable
obligation, and has become one of the three typical categories of cases
with which courts applying fiduciary principles must deal.""'
The second category of claims is Duty of Loyalty claims."

E

This

category has the longest pedigree and addresses primarily (but not
exclusively) situations involving self-dealing, wherein the duty of
loyalty is rigorously enforced by requiring the directors to justify as

103. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 727. But see
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 977-78 (noting that there are strong
reasons to treat the takeover contest differently, because of the severity of the agency cost
problems and lack of undistorted shareholder choice).
104. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 727.
105.

Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 861-62.

106. Id. at 862.
107. Id.
108. Id. "Where courts encountered troubling instances of director action in cases where the
directors had no apparent conflict of interest, the courts were inclined to ask loyalty-based
questions, such as whether the action constituted a fraud or a 'constructive fraud' against the
corporation or its minority shareholders." Id.
109. Id.
110. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors
breached its fiduciary duty of care by approving the sale of the Company upon two hours
consideration, without prior notice, without written documents and without the exigency of a
crisis or emergency).
I 11.

Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 862.

112. Id.
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intrinsically fair any transaction in which they had a financial interest.1 13
Evidently, after 1985 and three keenly felt decisions, 14 a third category
emerged in which "the directors have no direct pecuniary interest in the

transaction but have an 'entrenchment' interest, i.e., an interest in
protecting their existing control of the corporation."' 15 It is argued that
corporate law has always concerned itself with this issue but that

"entrenchment cases were never rationalized under a coherent theory.

Instead, they were adjudicated under a standard vaguely akin to
'fairness' or 'improper motive."' 11 6 This background provides the
understanding necessary to grapple with attempts to further restrict the
authority of directors.
A. Alternative Conceptions of CorporateGovernance?

Whether the disparate and often complementary claims by judges or
commentators offer a convincing argument for further restricting the
authority of directors and executives (via judicial or legislative action)
depends in part on whether one is predisposed to favor shareholder
primacy, managerial primacy,"' director primacy,"' or some version of
113.

Id.

114. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73; Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949
(Del. 1985) (upholding the "validity of a corporation's self-tender for its own shares which
exclude[d] from participation a stockholder making a hostile tender offer for the company's
stock" because the device adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat posed and, as such, it
was a proper exercise of the board's business judgment); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1980). See also Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 865
(describing the evolution of Delaware corporate law from 1920 to the present).
115. Id.at 862.
116. Id.at863.
117. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (describing the manner in which directors run a corporation as
analogous to the way an individual manages his own personal property). For a critique of Berle
& Means, see Robert Hessen, Corporations, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
563, 566 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993), where the author asserts:
Berle and Means' criticism overlooked how corporations were formed. The 'Fortune
500' corporations were not born as giants. Initially, each was the creation of one or a
few people who were the prime movers and promoters of the business and almost
always the principal sources of its original capital. They were able to 'go public'-sell
shares to outsiders to raise additional equity-only when they could persuade
underwriters and investors that they could put new money to work at a profit.
Id.
118. In contrast to shareholder primacy, "director primacy accepts shareholder wealth
maximization as the proper corporate decision-making norm but rejects the notion that
shareholders are entitled to either direct or indirect decision-making control." Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra note 65, at 563
(contrasting director and shareholder primacy); see also id. at 547-606 (rejecting the concept that
shareholders actually own a corporation in a philosophical sense); Lynn A. Stout, Investors'
Choices: The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
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corporate social responsibility as the proper corporate governance
model." 9 As recent history proves,
[o]ften the central theme of the debate in the mergers and acquisitions
area is which body has primacy to decide whether or not to accept
certain proposals-the stockholders or the directors. The advocates of
the property model favoring stockholder choice contend that the
stockholders must have that choice although they would want the
directors to negotiate for the best deal. By contrast, those who favor
the entity model rest their policy choice on the primacy of director
decision-making. ....
20
Additionally, the attractiveness of any one of several models of
corporate governance may be linked to whether one accepts empirical
data that demonstrates how corporations actually operate and
acknowledges theories of governance, which retain some plausible
predictive power.'21
Nevertheless, recent cases (particularly in
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 (2003) [hereinafter Stout,
Investors Choices] (noting the lack of informed shareholders has led to almost total board control
of a corporation).
119. For an introduction to the "new" corporate social responsibility, see generally Testy,
supra note 67, at 1227-50 (seeking to bolster the corporate social responsibility movement in a
more "progressive" direction). Testy further contends that the shareholder primacy model is the
currently prevailing view. For an excellent exposition of the available evidence, see Bainbridge,
DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra note 65, at 56374.
Insofar as control is concerned, U.S. corporate law is far more accurately described as
a system of director primacy than one of shareholder primacy. Shareholders exercise
virtually no control over either day-today operations or long-term policy. Instead,
control is vested in the hands of the board of directors.
Id. at 573.
120. Veasey, Dynamics of Corporate Governance, supra note 33, at 1014. Evidently, the
property school largely adheres to the efficient markets theory permitting corporate control to be
transferred relatively freely between buyers and sellers while those who adhere to the entity
model view the corporation as a societal institution with a purpose broader than simply serving
the economic advancement of stockholders. Id. at 1015. From an economic theoretic
perspective, one might be able to view directors from the normative perspective of an
organizational designer. The organization must respond to a changing and uncertain environment
and good responses may be costly to obtain. In addition, good response must be incentivecompatible, that is, each member of the organization must want to carry out her part of the total
organizational response in just the way the organizational designer intends. Marschak, supra note
53, at 223. If these claims are true, it is likely that directors are better equipped than shareholders
to respond to changes in the economic environment, can more economically obtain sufficient
information to provide a good response and further, their responses can be more easily made to
respond to incentives. For a rich discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the property
model and the entity model, see William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067-1100 (2002)
[hereinafter Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate] (advocating for a middle position between
the property model and entity model).
121. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra
note 65, at 606 (citing Milton Friedman's proposition that "the basic test for the validity of any
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Delaware) suggest a possible trend that favors shareholder governance
despite the statutorily ratified reality that the "firm's nominal owners,
the shareholders, exercise virtually no control over either day to day

operations or long-term policy, ' 122 and within large or even medium-

sized public corporations are unlikely to ever do so.
In spite of the gap between the shareholders capability to exercise
control and the assertion that they have, or should have, the right to do
so, the collapse of market euphoria coupled with the rise in corporate
scandals, and perhaps exacerbated by the long-term implications of a
2
questionable legal decision in a takeover controversy, 2 has focused

fresh attention on the capability or inability of shareholder governance

24 In part this focus
to curb rampant and out of control managers.'
confidence. 125
originates in an asserted need to revive investor

Appalling corporate behavior re-emphasizes a reliable paradigm: "An
theoretical model is its ability to make accurate predictions about the world"); see also
Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, supra note 22, at 3 ("Accordingly, a
model is properly judged by its predictive power with respect to the phenomena it purports to
explain, not by whether it is a valid description of an objective reality.").
122. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 512. "U.S. public
corporations are characterized by a separation of ownership and control." Id. Control consistent
with Berle and Means is "vested in the directors and their subordinate professional managers,
who typically own only a small portion of the firm's shares." Id. Disincentives to shareholder
activism are provided by statutory rules assigning decision-making to the board coupled with a
host of other statutory rules that indirectly prevent shareholders from exercising significant
influence such as: (1) disclosure requirements pertaining to large holders; (2) shareholder voting
and communication rules; and (3) insider trading and short swing profit rules. Taken together
these rules either directly limit shareholder authority or indirectly discourage the formation of
large stock blocks and discourage communication and coordination among shareholders. Id. An
alternative approach concentrates on a team production model of corporate governance, which
among other things argues that directors "are not subject to direct control or supervision by
anyone, including the firm's shareholders." See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team
Production in Business Organizations:An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) [hereinafter
Blair & Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations] (showing that shareholders as
residual claimants have a right to look over its corporate board); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) [hereinafter
Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory] (illustrating the principal-agent model to demonstrate
shareholders must take a more active role in corporate governance).
123. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.17 (Del.
1989) (citation omitted) (holding that the board of directors could use a poison pill to counter a
premium offer that was not structurally coercive). This decision is seen as questionable because
it significantly weakened the standards by which target takeover defenses are measured by
allowing both a broad category of cognizable threats that the board could justifiably respond to
and by weakening the proportionality requirements previously necessary to withstand judicial
scrutiny. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 485-86.
124. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 22, at 305-09 (describing shareholder governance as "The
Unused Lever").
125. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a
Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REv. 141, 142 (2003) (noting Congress has used changes to
corporate governance as the main vehicle to prop up investor confidence).
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effective board of directors is central to good corporate governance; and
good corporate governance, in turn, is central to good corporate
performance. ' ' 26 Thus, it is believable that "corporate corruption and
abuses ... [concentrate] attention on the board of directors and on

corporate governance more broadly.',

27

As a result of this attention,

specific curative proposals have been vetted. These include proposals
advocating that shareholders reclaim their power to reform executive

compensation through proxy contests and mandating that institutional
investors acquire the power to nominate one or more minority directors
on the corporation's own proxy statement, 21 which might complement
already existing or imaginary institutional activism. 129 Additionally,
with proposals aimed at improving accountability, advocates of
shareholder voting as a vehicle for attaining "undistorted shareholder
choice" in a hostile takeover context have suggested a policy that
constrains directors' discretion with respect to the deployment of
defenses in hostile takeover context while simultaneously arguing that

the vindication

of shareholder

decision-making

in this arena

"strengthens and reinforces" the legitimacy of the board's exercise of

discretionary authority in other spheres of decision-making. 3 ° This
syllogism appears uncertain."' While "more regulation might do more
harm than good,' ' 3 2 and while all efforts designed to strengthen
accountability in the context of scandal are not directly-or at least not
always-related to appropriate policy recommendations in a takeover
context, it is likely that every effort aimed at ensuring more shareholder
democracy and control may suffer the difficulties inherent in collective
126. Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the
Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 495 (Nancy
B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate
Governance].
127. Id.
128. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 305-07 (outlining the manner in which shareholders can
exert control); see also Federal Power Threatens Role of State Law, Former Delaware Chief
Justice Veasey Warns, 83 BNA BANKING REP., No. 7 (Aug. 16, 2004).
129. Karmel, supra note 22, at 17 ("Because public pension funds continue to devote an
increasing amount of their assets to equities, they are the most activist on corporate governance
matters and have increasing clout."). But see Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, supra note 23, at 803-04 ("Even the most active institutional investors spend only
trifling amounts on corporate governance activism.... Not surprisingly, empirical studies of U.S.
institutional investor activism have found 'no strong evidence of a correlation between firm
performance and percentage of shares owned by institutions."').
130. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 996.
131. See Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy in CorporateTakeovers, supra note 23, at 808 ("In my
view, however, shareholder choice more likely would weaken and undermine the board's
authority in a variety of areas.").
132. Paredes, Enron: The Board, CorporateGovernance, supranote 126, at 495.
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Collective action involves individuals who are incompletely, if not
indifferently informed, 34 and who are driven by disparate, if not
As such, persistent
opportunistic, preferences and behavior. 35
adherence to the allure of the shareholder governance ideal may
inadvertently but inevitably contribute to the unrelenting vigor of
economist Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 36 as well as the
enduring charm of the nirvana fallacy. 3 7 Nonetheless, it is argued that
the sundry proposals offered might lead, inter alia, to significant
negotiation between institutional shareholders and corporate managers
Predictably, these
over specific executive compensation issues."'
efforts might activate dispositive and expansive conceptions of
shareholder rights in numerous contexts-including takeovers-by
reconfiguring corporate governance so that shareholders' ostensible
accountability qualms furnish a seductive skeleton, which trumps and
diminishes directors' claims of authority.

133. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 17 (1974) ("A truly rational
discussion of collective action in general or in specific contexts is necessarily complex, and what
is even worse, it is necessarily incomplete and unresolved"). But see Bebchuk, The Case Against
Board Veto, supra note 5, at 976 (arguing that collective-action problems can be effectively
addressed without providing boards with veto power).
134. "Modern behavioral economics ... recognizes that individuals, including investors, have
'bounded rationality' and do not pursue all information relevant to an optimal decision ....
[Ilndividuals typically make decisions by using heuristics-i.e., rules of thumb-rather than by
incorporating and processing all obtainable information." Coffee, supra note 22, at 294.
135. Dooley, supra note 24, at 464-65 ("'[O]pportunism' ... refers to the constant human
temptation to pursue self-interest at the expense of others, even when cooperative behavior would
be most beneficial to all concerned.").
136. For an introduction to some of these issues, see Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1219-93 (1994) (introducing the concept of
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in plain language); see also NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 91 n.17 (1997)
(stating that Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that there is no collective decision-making
scheme that can satisfy the requisite ethical properties). The Impossibility Theorem implies that
"no legislative process can simultaneously satisfy the five assumptions on legislative fairness."
Steams, supra, at 2. More broadly speaking, the theorem suggest "that political outcomes will be
entirely incoherent and that the whole concept of the 'public interest' is meaningless because
Arrow argues that no method of combining individual preferences can satisfy these specific and
basic requirements: (a) minimum rationality; (b) the pareto standard; (c) non-dictatorship; (d)
independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (e) universal applicability. DANIEL A. FARBER AND
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-39 (1991).
137. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1,
1 (1969) ("The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the
relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'imperfect' institutional arrangement
.... In practice those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between
the ideal and the real and if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient.").
138. Coffee, supra note 22, at 305-07.
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The validity or invalidity of policy recommendations within any
context (scandal or takeover) may depend heavily on foundational
assumptions about corporate governance. Whatever the merits of the
various proposals, they may be fortified or vitiated by understanding
that while it is likely that "the shareholder primacy norm is embodied

neither in past or present legal standards nor corporate practice, most
commentators ...continue to place this model on quite a pedestal."'3 9

If true, some form of shareholder primacy will often provide the
normative foundation for policy recommendations, whatever the
context.' 40
Contemporary policy recommendations and judicial
decisions are often grounded in or attached to shareholder primacy
models or other conventional models such as the corporate social
responsibility model,' 4' the principal-agent model 42 or models that
139. Testy, supra note 67, at 1231 (citing D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278-79 (1998)); see also Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, supra note 22, at 5 ("[M]ost corporate law scholars today embrace some variant of
shareholder primacy.").
140. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 23, at 798
(critically examining the policy recommendations of Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Bonds, supra note 5, in a takeover context).
141. Confusingly, corporate social responsibility models of governance are often presented as
"new" or "progressive." For example, one observer contends that "[tiheories of corporate social
responsibility cast a potentially broader net, emphasizing all of the social costs of corporate
activity, and therefore embrace, for example, environmental or political concerns as well as
stakeholder interest." David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the
Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1002 n.5 (2000). This claim
remains debatable since it is far from clear why any investor might or should voluntarily accept
the maximization of environmental or political concerns as either a measurable or desirable goal
when such goals can be pursued, however imperfectly, by investing in the public markets. An
elementary understanding of public choice theory implies that:
Individuals choose, and as they do so, identifiable economic interest is one of the
"goods" that they value positively, whether behavior takes place in markets or in
politics. But markets are institutions of exchange; persons enter markets to exchange
one thing for another. They do not enter markets to further some supra-exchange or
supra-individualistic result. Markets are not motivationally functional; there is no
conscious sense on the part of individual choosers that some preferred aggregate
outcome, some overall "allocation" or "distribution," will emerge from the process.
The extension of this exchange conceptualization to politics counters the classical
prejudice that persons participate in politics through some common search for the
good, the true, and the beautiful, with these ideals being defined independently of the
values of the participants as these might or might not be expressed by behavior.
Politics, in this vision of political philosophy, is instrumental to the furtherance of
these larger goals.
James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 107 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988). It is
accordingly doubtful that shareholders can be seen as some cohesive group who wish to
maximize some independent conception of the good, the beautiful, and the true in addition to
some desirable economic return and then be seen to act collectively to inform and enforce what
are actually incommensurable norms via the proper monitoring of their agents-or alternatively
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143
attempt to protect "shareholder property rights in control premia."'
This constellation of alternatives shares one attribute-it may elevate
shareholder, stakeholder, or judicial control without necessarily
contributing to either shareholder or societal wealth.
One
Consider first the corporate social responsibility model.
it
may
that
is
model
responsibility
social
corporate
difficulty with the
appear as an exogenously driven model in which directors cast a broad
net that allows them to emphasize the political, social, and
environmental concerns of putative stakeholders such as the community
or workers.' 44 This approach has its own reward, allowing directors to
select which external value or interest to maximize particularly when
and if they are congruent with their own internal preferences. These
values and interests may be both immeasurable and incommensurable.
Hence, fiduciary duty violations may be impossible to prove.
The second option presents similar difficulties. As a long-standing
model attached to the separation of ownership and control, the
principal-agent archetype is supported by the deduction that "because of
collective action problems and rational apathy, dispersed shareholders
are unable to coordinate their activities, and effective control of the
corporation ends up in the hands of management.' ' 45 Agency theory as
the prime component of the principal-agent model "does not expressly
offer a view of how authority should be allocated within a corporation,
but it is suggestive ... [of the shareholders'] ability to change the scope
of her agent's authority and duties.', 146 As discussed later, "the
principal-agent model still has currency, particularly in the courts.' 47
The third option concentrates on the shareholders property rights in
control premia. As a general matter, this third approach is difficult to

that managers and directors charged with such a task will not simply maximize their own
preferences while couching their decisions in the language of the good, the beautiful and the true.
Properly understood, the corporate social responsibility model allows some to exercise their
preferences at the expense of others while couching that exercise in wonderful sounding
language. As thus understood, the corporate social responsibility model is merely one of many
conventional models of corporate governance in which actors often exercise their own selfinterest and as such, the claim that this model exists in some counter-hegemonic sense remains
highly speculative.
142. See Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 109-12 (describing
the principal-agent model).
143. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 735 (discussing
but rejecting this possibility).
144. For a discussion of the advantages of corporate social responsibility including the
possibility that directors can cast a broad net, see Millon, supra note 141, at 1002 n.5.
145. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 109.
146. Id. at 111.
147. Id.
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in Moran v. Household

International.148 Additionally, "a shareholder's ability to dispose of his
stock.., is not defined by notions of private property, but rather by the
terms of the corporate contract, which in turn are provided by the firm's
organic documents and the state of incorporation's corporate statute and
common law.' ' 149 In sum, the claim that "shareholders have the right to
make the final decision about an unsolicited tender offer does not
necessarily follow, for example, from the mere fact that shareholders
have voting rights."' 15
In contradistinction to this scaffold-which
includes several versions of shareholder primacy that taken as whole,
are "neither normatively persuasive nor descriptively accurate,".5 '-the
52

director primacy model including shareholder wealth maximization'

but excluding shareholder control may well prove inadequate-except
when compared to the alternatives.
Legal scholar Stephen Bainbridge amplifies the strengths of the
director primacy perspective by stating that the director primacy model
describes the corporation as a vehicle by which the board of directors
hires various factors of production. The board of directors is not an
agent of the shareholders; rather, the board is the embodiment of the
corporate principal, serving as the nexus of the various contracts
making up the corporations.' 53
Director primacy admits that centralized decision-making is an
indispensable component of corporate governance. 14 Thus, authority

148. Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) (finding that
"shareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids ... [their] ability to gain
premiums through takeover activity is subject to the good faith business judgment of the board of
directors"), affd 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
149. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 710-11.
150. Id. at 710.
151. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 86 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention]
(criticizing the shareholder primacy model specifically).
152. See Dooley, supra note 24, at 466 (outlining the questions which a governance structure
can answer). Dooley writes:
[T]he participants in a firm must have some governance structure to determine three
basic questions. First, what are the general sorts of adaptive decisions that will need to
be made over time? Second, what general normative principle guides decisionmaking-that is, for whose benefit are decisions to be made? And third, who, within
the firm, shall make the adaptive decisions? The answer to the second question is the
same for all capitalist firms: decisions are made to benefit the interests of the residual
claimants because maximizing their wealth necessarily maximizes the wealth of the
coalition.
Id.
153. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 86.
154. Id.

2005]

Director Primacy and Corporate Governance

1137

"is vested neither in the shareholder nor in the managers, but rather in
the board of directors."' 55 Normatively, "vesting the power of fiat in the
concerns. '9 56
board of directors raises legitimate accountability
Resolving the tension between authority and accountability, the central
problem of corporate law mandates focused attention on the principal
mechanism by which corporate law resolves that conflict-the business
judgment rule.'57 However, the
business judgment rule commonly is understood today as a standard of
liability by which courts review the decisions of the board of directors
... the rule [may be] better understood as a doctrine of abstention
pursuant to which the courts in fact refrain from reviewing1 58board
decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.
Consistent with this approach, the business judgment rule should be
treated neither as some minor deity by its acolytes, nor as charlatan-a
15 9 The
virtuoso of obscurantism and pretension-by its detractors.
director primacy model as thus understood is a doctrine that urges
judicial restraint, even in the face of scandal, conflicts of interest, and
worries of entrenchment.
The foregoing discussion underscores Professor Dooley's lucid claim
that there are in reality two models of corporate governance. While
60
neither model exists in absolutely pristine form, the first model of
Its
corporate governance "can be called the 'Authority Model.'
substance appears to be the prevailing judicial and statutory
precedent,"' 6 ' despite the persistence of some contradictory judicial
language 162 suggesting that the shareholders are the principal.
Alternatively, the "second model of corporate governance is the
'Responsibility Model,' exemplified by the [American Law Institute's]
Governance Project."'' 63 The Models differ in perspective. Consistent
with contemporary conversations about scandal and the resultant
demand for revitalized accountability, the Responsibility Model

155. Id.
156. Id. at 86.
157. Id. at 86-87.
158. Id. at 87.
159. My debt to Paul J. Griffiths should be obvious. See Paul J. Griffiths, Christ and Critical
Theory, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at 49.
160. Dooley, supra note 24, at 463.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., infra Part III.B(1)-(2), C (discussing Blasius, a case in which the court
articulated a higher standard of scrutiny than even the Unocal standard for cases in which a
board's actions have the primary purpose of impairing the shareholder franchise, and reviewing
that decision in light of the tension between authority and accountability).
163. Dooley, supra note 24, at 463.
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concentrates on the possibility that agents may engage in indiscretions
by formulating an appropriate set of substantive rules and procedures
that "can best remedy and deter individual deviations from the
commonwealth of the firm."' 64 Emphasis and particularly overemphasis

on remedies and deterrence may imply a shareholder primacy norm
predicated on the principal-agent theory or some other related theory.
On the other hand, via reasonable conclusions about the actual control

and management of firms, "the focus of the Authority Model is on the
ordinary operation of the firm on a day-to-day, year-to-year basis: what
set of substantive rules and procedures best supports the most efficient

decision-making process for the publicly held firm?"1 65 Parenthetically,
Delaware general corporate law "is structured ...to preclude equity

investors from having a legally enforceable expectation of entitlement
to sell the corporation without board assent ...[because] under the

statute almost every significant corporation transaction requires board

approval.'66 While developing the appropriate set of rules remains a

work in progress, it is probable that public corporations can be best
understood as part of a nexus of contracts, 167 which inexorably implies
hierarchy and bureaucracy, mandating the director primacy model in
which the "board ...is a mediating hierarch" and does (and should)

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 120, at 1086.
167. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Board of Directorsas Nexus of Contracts, supra note 22, at 333 (arguing for a board-centered understanding of the corporation where the directors serve as the
nexus for the contracts that make up the corporation). Ultimately, my views are largely
influenced by my understanding Jacques Ellul's persuasive conceptualization and conclusions
about law:
[Ellul's] thinking on law derives from his wider analysis of the modem world which,
from the 1930s onward, argued that the dominance and novelty of Technique was
creating a wholly new situation that had to be challenged because it was destroying the
human person and the central features of civilization.
ANDREW GODDARD, LIVING THE WORD, RESISTING THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF

JACQUES ELLUL 200 (2002). The living law by contrast (le droit vivant) "is born at the same time
as human relationships. Law arises with contact between two people for it is made for people. It
arises with spontaneity." Id. at 201. If this perspective is persuasive, it is my view that
contractarian theory, which leads to director primacy, may be most consistent with Ellul's
conception of law in the more general sense. As thus understood, and as part of the "domain of
choice... [t]he founders and managers of a firm choose whether to organize as a corporation,
trust, partnership, mutual or cooperative."
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments; The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1417 (1989). Accordingly:
The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law
enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of
risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy. No one set of terms will
be best for all; hence the "enabling" structure of corporate law.
Id. at 1418.
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68
have extensive authority over the enterprise.1

B. ShareholderChoice, DirectorDiscretion:
The Current Judicial Framework

The logic of "[s]hareholder

choice

is grounded in several

The concentration on board infringement of one
arguments.'
component of shareholder choice-the shareholder franchise-has
resulted in often intrusive and possibly unrestrained judicial scrutiny.
' 69

Such scrutiny is justifiable if shareholders are the owners of
corporations. 70 This hypothesis' 71 serves as a backdrop for a number of
recent Delaware Court decisions.7

Delaware courts maintain that "[a]

168. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 128 (describing this view
but not necessarily agreeing).
169. Id. at 134.
170. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (naming, as fundamental to
Delaware law, the concept that the board has the legal duty to manage the affairs of a corporation
for the benefit of its shareholder owners). But see Stout, Investors' Choices, supra note 118, at
667 (discussing Malone but ultimately disagreeing with its position because the metaphor of
shareholder ownership is both empirically incorrect and misleading in that naming shareholders
as owners implies certain rights of control that shareholders simply do not possess).
171. This hypothesis may be questionable. See generally Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra note 65, at 547-90 (expressing doubts and
exploring instead the merits of the director primacy models). Evidently, since the publication of
Ronald Coase's famous article, the Nature of the Firm, "both economists and legal scholars have
devoted considerable attention to the theory of the firm." Id. at 547. Bainbridge suggests that
directors and officers are more than mere stewards of the shareholders' interest, relying on the
notion that corporations consists of a "nexus of contracts" which denies that shareholders own the
corporation. Id. Hence, "shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound
together in a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. Contractarian theory nevertheless
continues to treat directors and officers as contractual agents of the shareholders, with fiduciary
obligations to maximize shareholder wealth." Id. at 548. This approach leads ineluctably to the
director primacy model as both a means and ends of corporate governance because it is based on
contractarian theory. Id. at 547-62.
172. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d 1118, 1131-32 (Del. 2003) (holding that where the
board of directors expanded its size from five to seven in a defensive action, the burden was on
the directors to show that the action was a proportionate, reasonable response to the threat posed);
In re The MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that
where a disinterested and independent majority of directors acted in accordance with their
fiduciary duties when they postponed a shareholders meeting, set a new record date, and held an
election of directors, a motion for a preliminary injunction based on allegations that the directors
interfered with the effectiveness of a shareholder vote will not be granted); Acker v. Transurgical,
Inc., No. 201-N, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2004) (holding that the
plaintiff stated a claim wherein he alleged that the firm failed to take all necessary and desirable
actions to facilitate the election of two representatives whom the plaintiffs designated to the board
of directors pursuant to a shareholder agreement, similar to the conduct at issue in Liquid Audio
where the Supreme Court held that Liquid Audio's incumbent board harmed MM Companies
when it expanded the board from five to seven members which diminished the influence of MM's
nominees). The consideration of claims by shareholders that certain categories of board conduct
interfere with shareholders voting rights has not been limited to Delaware. See, e.g., Simon Prop.
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board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon

issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is
strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a
'compelling justification.""'9 73
As explicated later, the recent
revitalization of this framework may have adverse consequences to the
development of a reasoned conception of directorial authority. 74
The prevailing judicial outlook applies the exacting "compelling

justification" criterion in circumstances in which self-interested or

faithless fiduciaries act to deprive stockholders of a full and fair

opportunity to participate in the matter when such circumstances appear
to frustrate the will of a majority of stockholders. 175 Courts "will not

allow the wrongful subversion of corporate democracy by manipulation

of corporate machinery...,,176 when the conduct at issue impairs

shareholders ability to, for example, "replace the incumbent directors

when they stand for re-election.' ' 77 If this conclusion had been limited
simply to shareholders' contract rights as articulated by Delaware
statutes, this view might have been uncontroversial, but this expansive
conception of shareholder rights constrains the often necessary authority
of directors both within and outside of an actual or threatened control

contest.
Furthermore, courts have enjoined supermajority bylaw provisions
adopted by boards during a contest for control where the design of such
provisions is to make it more difficult for the acquirer to eliminate the
Group, Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943-44 (E.D. Michigan 2003) (reasoning that
public interest is served in protecting shareholder rights to control and a heightened standard of
review is appropriate where the board denies shareholders the right to vote on a tender offer).
173. Allen et al., Function Over Fonn, supra note 82, at 889 (citing Stroud, v. Grace 606 A.2d
75, 82 (1992).
174. See Parts IH.C and IV, infra (setting forth the court's holding in Blasius and the
development of case law which was first marked by a reluctance to apply Blasius, but has
recently been seen as an expansion of its doctrines).
175. When such circumstances are not present the business judgment rule will ordinarily
apply in recognition of the fact that directors must continue to manage the business and affairs of
the corporation, even with respect to matters that they have placed before the stockholders for a
vote. MONY Group, 853 A.2d at 667; Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). While Peerless did not "involve issues touching on
control, the court applied the Blasius standard because it perceived that the self-interested CEO's
actions [the postponement on vote that he apparently favored] were taken to interfere with the
stockholder vote, which at the time was running against the proposal." MONY Group, 853 A.2d
at 675 n.51. The totality of the circumstances and actions taken in connection with the
adjournment evidently suggested an improper purpose. Therefore the defendants retained the
"burden of showing a compelling justification for their actions." Id.
176. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1127 (quoting Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 473 A.2d 232, 239
(Del. 1982)).
177. Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
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target firm's classified board structure, remove incumbent directors, and
Before probing the evolving
take control of the new board. 178
framework that attempts to resolve the tension between directors and
shareholders, and between authority and accountability, consider briefly
the adoption and/or amendment of corporate bylaws patterns:
Bylaws are the rules a corporation adopts to govern its internal affairs.
Bylaws tend to be far more detailed than articles of incorporation...
[and] typically deal with such matters as number and qualifications of
directors, board vacancies, board committees, quorum and notice
requirement for shareholder and board meetings, procedures for
calling special shareholder and board meetings, any special voting
of shares, and tides and
procedures, any limits on the transferability
79
duties of the corporation's officers. 1
Moreover, bylaw amendments, unlike charter amendments, attract far
more judicial scrutiny. 8 ° One can convincingly argue that when
provoked by efficiency considerations, 8 ' the separation of ownership
and control signifies that the "preservation of board discretion should
always be the null hypothesis."'' 8 2 There is substantial scholarly
authority cited by the Delaware courts suggesting "that bylaws cannot
be used to impede the managerial authority of the board to use a
shareholder rights plan"'183 even if "a core function of the84 bylaws is to
decisions."'
address the process by which the board makes
While board conduct may be lawful, "inequitable action does not
178. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000). See Seth Goodchild,
Delaware Court Enjoins Supermajority Bylaw Adopted During Contest for Control2 (2000), at
http:/Iibrary.1p.findlaw.com/articles/filee/0088/003326/title/Subject/topic/Securities% OLaw-Sh
(2000) (discussing the Chesapeake
areholder%20Disputes/filename/securitieslawl_292
decision).
179. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 43. Typically, the
incorporator or the initial directors at the corporation's organizational meeting adopt the
corporation's initial bylaws. At early common law, only shareholders had the power to amend
the bylaws but today many states allow shareholders to delegate the power to amend bylaws to
the board of directors. Id. at 43-45.
180. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 499.
181. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 47-48
(discussing the economic justifications of the board's authority and primacy). Bainbridge asserts:
The board's primacy has a compelling economic justification. The separation of
ownership and control mandated by corporate law is a highly efficient solution to the
decision-making problems faced by large corporations ... because collective decisionmaking is impracticable in such firms, they are characterized by authority-based
decision-making structures in which a central agency (the board) is empowered to
make decisions binding on the firm as a whole.
Id.
182. Id. at 517.
183. Hollinger Int'l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1079 n.130 (Del. Ch. 2004).
184. Id.
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become permissible simply because it is legally possible."'85

In

agreement with this observation, one early case disallowed a board-

initiated bylaw proposal because changing "the date of the corporation's
annual meeting ... was a legally permissible amendment for the

equitably impermissible purpose of defeating a proxy contest in which
insurgent shareholders sought to oust the incumbent board."' 8 6 The
principles embedded in this approach demonstrate that Delaware courts
"likely would examine the purpose for which the board amended or
repealed a shareholder-adopted bylaw.
If the board did so to

disenfranchise shareholders and/or entrench itself in office, for example,
the action likely would not pass muster."'8 7

Conversely, when

shareholders act to constrain the discretion of the board through the
adoption of shareholder-initiated bylaws, courts have not always
permitted such limitations. In one case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
addressed a bylaw proposed by shareholders limiting the number of
directors. 88 As proposed, the bylaw contained a provision prohibiting
the board from amending or repealing it. 8 9 The court noted that the
corporation's articles gave "the board broad authority to fix the number
of directors ... through adoption of bylaws" and opined that the
proposed bylaw "would be a nullity if adopted."'' ° Consequently, the
court accepted the necessity and value of the private ordering of
business relationships while protecting the control of directors. In
reality, court decisions inspecting shareholder actions and efforts aimed
at vindicating corporate democracy hint at two contradictory
conclusions: that the board manages the corporation and that the board
is subject to statutory provisions or shareholder initiated corporate
bylaws that seem to limit the discretion of the directors.' 9 '
185. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (1971).
186. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 45 (citing Schnell,
285 A.2d at 439).
187. Id. at 45 (invalidating board action undertaken "for the primary purpose of preventing
the effectiveness of a shareholder vote." (citing Blasius Indus., Inc., v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651
(Del. Ch. 1988))). The broad principles embedded in this view have been extended. For
example, it is possible that when a board erects anti-takeover defenses which prevent
shareholders from receiving any tender offers or when the defensive measure acts to prevent
proxy contests, the courts will step in to invalidate such provisions. See, e.g., Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (recognizing that the board can erect certain
defenses which deter certain types of bids but implied that the board must allow some opportunity
for the bidder to present a bid to shareholders).
188. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990) (addressing
a situation in which shareholders passed a bylaw limiting the number of directors, and which
could not be repealed by the board of directors).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 43-48.
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In any case, sustaining shareholder voting rights as integral to
corporate governance, and the attendant denial of directorial authority,
9 2 This
has proven irresistible to a number of courts and commentators.
viewpoint, facilitated by a trend that treats the business judgment rule as
a substantive doctrine that expands the scope of director liability and

allows judges room to examine the substantive merits of the board's
decision 193 may be in error or even worse, since shareholder voting has
very little to do with corporate decision-making and has only limited
194

mechanisms.
vitality as one of many corporate accountability
195
Shareholders can theoretically vote inattentive directors out of office.

In practice, this device is of limited usefulness.' 96 In fact, the product

capital and employment markets may be more important than voting as
a constraint on agency costs 197 because they affect management more
quickly and directly than voting in the form of rather cumbersome
proxy contests. Nevertheless, shareholder voting does matter in the
contest for corporate control and if agency costs rise high enough, it will
become profitable for some outsiders to acquire a controlling block of
shares and exercise their associated voting rights to oust the incumbent
board. 198 These conclusions imply (1) that director primacy may be
more consistent with the actual authority expected of directors; (2) that
99
shareholder governance remains more sought after than real,' despite
192. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (disallowing
board action undertaken for the primary purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder
vote); Phillips v. Insituform of North America, Inc., 1987 WL 16285 (Del. Ch. 1987) (granting a
preliminary injunction against board-adopted bylaws which were apparently intended to preclude
one class of shareholders from controlling the corporation); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d
293, 244-45 (Del. Ch. 2000) (applying the Blasius standard to the board's conduct when they
adopt a supermajority bylaw as a vehicle to reduce the voting power of minority
shareholder/hostile acquirer and here the defendant board could not satisfy the compelling
justification standard ). It is possible that the court's decision in Chesapeake would have been the
same without Blasius. See supra Part II (discussing Chesapeake).
193. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 87 (noting
that the business judgment rule is commonly understood as a standard of liability employed by
the courts in reviewing board of director decisions, but suggesting that the rule should be viewed
instead as a doctrine of abstention).
194. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 441.
195. Id.
196. Id. Voting directors out of office is of limited value because in "the real world ... socalled proxy contests are subject to numerous legal and practical impediments that render them
largely untenable as a tool for disciplining managers." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Apparently:
Some proponents of shareholder primacy concede that shareholders lack formal control
of the corporation, but argue that they still exercise ultimate de facto control.
According to John Coates, for example, the market for corporate control ensures a
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judicial and scholarly attachment to shareholder voting; 0 0 and (3) that

courts may do well to heed the case for judicial restraint premised on
the justifiable claim that the board of directors is not an agent of the
shareholders. 20 ' Lastly, arguments aimed at restricting the board's
authority in the tender offer or takeover context will likely "undermine

the board's authority in other contexts. 2

2

In sum, the case for further

restricting directorial discretion remains brittle.
III. THE EVOLVING FRAMEWORK
The transition from the older body of law developed during the
period between 1920 and 1980 to the current design was not easy but
reflects changes in the global capital and international product
markets20 3 as well as the capability of lawyers to develop novel theories
in response to these developments. Judges have led this transition by

creating changes in judicial standards of review without necessarily
adequately taking into account the policy purposes those standards were
intended to achieve and by simply creating additional 2°4 and less

deferential judicial standards when fewer and more modest standards
might be preferable. These changes reflect an emerging consensus that
suggests an increased willingness by the courts to interfere with the

management of the corporate entity. 205
A. Balancing Director-ShareholderPower in a Takeover Context
The "watershed year of 1985 ",206 furnished three decisions that keenly
residual form of shareholder control, transforming the 'limited de jure shareholder
voice into a powerful de facto form of shareholder control.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 23, at 802. In reality, while

the market for corporate control depends on the existence of shareholder voting rights, the
shareholders maintain the right to fire directors but not the capability to exercise fiat, or in other
words, not the capability to issue arbitrary decrees of control. Id.
200. See supra Parts I & II (discussing the concept of shareholder governance as an illusion).
201.

See generally Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at

84-102 (noting that the business judgment rule is designed to effect compromise between
authority and accountability and recognizing that while ownership and control of publicly traded
companies raises accountability concerns, efficiency is accomplished through granting the board
of directors' decision-making authority).
202. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 711.
203.

See, e.g., Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 863-64 (arguing that

unprecedented developments in the capital and international product markets created the
environment for a sweeping change in Delaware law).
204. Id. at 864.
205. See infra Part III (warning that an unrestrained understanding of Blasius could lead to
judicial enhancement of shareholder rights and authority).
206. Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576.

See also Allen et al.,

Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 865 (noting that from 1985 through 1993 and the period
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affected the then emerging firestorm of often hostile corporate takeover
activity in the United States. 2 7 These decisions also affected the debate
over allocation of power in the context of takeovers. "One reason that
could be given for granting boards a veto power is a concern that
shareholders facing a takeover bid might be unable to exercise an
undistorted choice. In the absence of any restrictions on bidders,
20 8
A related reason suggests
shareholders might be pressured to tender.,
premiums when
shareholder
increase
may
that director entrenchment
20 9
defensive
board's
the
In Unocal,
and if the firm is ultimately sold.
response changed neither the bylaws nor the corporate charter and
hence it was possible that the board's conduct complied with the
incorporators' decision to "endow directors with significant power over
whether and how to sell the company ' ' 20 consistently with the firm's
"constitutional choice of governance structure."2 "
Altering previous formulations of the business judgment rule,2 12
which implied judicial restraint, the Supreme Court of Delaware (after
evaluating the validity of a corporation's self-tender excluding the
21 3
hostile bidder in response to a potentially coercive hostile bid),
"commenced the development of an 'enhanced' business judgment rule
21 4
and its progeny.,
in contests for corporate control ... in Unocal
"[E]nhanced judicial scrutiny, as a threshold or a condition precedent to
an application of the traditional business judgment rule, is now well
known., 21 5 By steering an intermediate or middle course, "the Delaware
Supreme Court [sic.] reaffirmed the target's board['s] general decisionmaking primacy, which includes an obligation to determine whether the

thereafter the courts endeavored to shape the revolutionary decisions of Van Gorkom, Unocal and
Revlon into a consistent and coherent body of legal doctrine).
207. Paul L. Regan, What's Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 948 (2001) (discussing
the trilogy of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., and Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.).
208. Bebchuk, The CaseAgainst Board Veto, supra note 5, at 981.
209. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 522 (advancing a rationale that it is
reasonable for shareholders to opt for a board veto in order to enable the board to employ selling
strategies and increase the premium shareholders might receive).
210. Id.at473.
211. Id.
212. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985); see also Veasey, The
Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576 (stating that the traditional formation of the
business judgment rule was altered in Unocal because of the omnipresent specter of director

interest in entrenchment).
213.
214.
215.

Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
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offer is in the best interests of the shareholders. ' 16 Because of the
possibility that the board will place its interest ahead of the
shareholders, judicial review is somewhat
more intrusive than under the
217
traditional business judgment rule.
First, the initial burden of proof is placed on the directors to show
that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy or effectiveness existed.1 8 Showing good faith and a reasonable
investigation can satisfy this burden." 9 Good faith obliges the directors
to prove that they were motivated to act in response to a perceived
threat to the corporation and not for the purpose of entrenching
themselves in office. 220
A reasonable investigation "requires a
demonstration that the board was adequately informed with the relevant
standard being one of gross negligence. 22' If the directors carry their
initial burden, they must next prove that the defense created was
reasonable in relationship to the threat posed by the hostile bidder.222
Apparently both the decision to adopt and any subsequent decision to
implement a set of takeover defenses are subject to challenge and
judicial review.223 In practice, "the board's initial burden of proof
quickly became the whole ball game"-if the directors carried their
two-step burden, the business judgment rule was applied to test the
proportionality of their response to the perceived threat-but if the
directors failed to carry their initial burden, the duty of loyalty's
intrinsic fairness test applied.224 Properly understood, Unocal solves the
problem of outcome determination not so much by creating a different
standard of judicial review as by creating a vehicle for determining on a
case-by-case basis which of the traditional doctrinal standards was
appropriate for the particular case at issue.225 "If the directors carried
their [initial] two-step burden, the business judgment rule applied, but if
the directors failed to carry their initial burden, the duty of loyalty's
intrinsic fairness test applied. 226 For this reason, the "Unocal test is
216. Id. at 702.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 702-03.
222. Id. at 703.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONOMICS, supra note 12, at 703 (discussing
the two-step process in which the burden is applied to directors: first to show that there were
reasonable grounds for believing the corporation was in danger; and, second to show that the
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more properly seen as a conditional version of the business judgment
rule, rather than an intermediate standard. 227

Whether it is simply a conditional version of the business judgment
rule or not, enhanced scrutiny is triggered by an "'inherent conflict of

interest' during conflicts for corporate control., 228 This inevitably leads
to "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own

interests,

rather

than

those

of

the

corporation

and

its

229

Without question, "[a]lthough authority is essential for
shareholders.
organization efficiency, it must be exercised responsibly. Because
human cognitive powers are limited and subject to being overwhelmed
by information flows, unaccountable authority is likely to make
unnecessary errors.,

230

The case law largely confirms, "unaccountable

authority may be exercised opportunistically. The central decision
benefit rather than
maker may divert organizational resources to its own
231
the good of the organization and its constituents.,
The Unocal solution to this problem insists "before the board is
accorded the protection of the business judgment rule, and that rule's

concomitant placement of the burden to rebut its presumption on the

232
plaintiff, the board must carry its own initial two-part burden.
Whether this solution is absolutely correct or not exceeds the scope of
this article. As we have seen, this migration from the traditional rule
and its rationale has two elements: first, a threshold alteration in the
burden of proof requiring directors to show by their good faith and
reasonable investigation that they reasonably perceived a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness; and second, the court must review
the reasonableness or proportionality of the corporate action taken in
response to a threatened takeover. 233 An important limitation implies

response was reasonable to the threat posed).
227. Id. Thus, "[tihe Unocal rule solved the problem of outcome determination not so much
by creating a different standard of review, as by creating a mechanism for determining on an
individual basis which of the traditional doctrinal standards was appropriate for the particular
case at bar." Id.
228. Unitrin Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
229. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
230. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 107 (footnote

omitted).
231. Id.
232. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (interpreting and citing Unocal).
233. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. This departure from the traditional view may weaken the
presumption that "in managing or overseeing the management of a business, directors must have
wide discretion to delegate, to take risks, and not be second-guessed by courts." Veasey, The
Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576. Under the traditional approach:
[the] only real limitations on [director's] discretion are: (1) the directors should not
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that the "Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally

(i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in
reaction to a perceived threat. ' 23 4 Since "[n]either issues of fairness nor
business judgment are pertinent without the basic underpinning of a
board's legal power to act, ' the court's search for principles originates
"with the basic issue of the power of a board of directors
of a Delaware
' 236
corporation to adopt a defensive measure.

Although it has been briskly argued (by three present and former
members of the Court of Chancery) that the corporation law of
Delaware (case and statutory) remains robustly ambivalent, overall the

statutory foundation, the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL")
"broadly empowers corporations to accomplish virtually any lawful act,
subject only to the requirement that the acts be accomplished in the
manner provided in the statute and they be approved by directors acting
in conformity with their fiduciary obligations. 237 In general terms
established in unambiguous statutory language, the "board has a large
reservoir of authority upon which to draw.
Its duties and

responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers conferred by 8 Del. C.
§ 141(a), respecting management of the corporation's 'business and
affairs.' ' 238 Among other things, Unocal states that a "Delaware
corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the
directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench
themselves in office. 239 Moreover, "the board's power to act derives
enjoy the presumption of the business judgment rule if they were not making a
business decision or if they were interested, not independent, not acting in good faith or
grossly negligent in their decision-making process; and (2) to be sustainable, their
decision may not be shown to have been devoid of any rational business purpose or to
be so irrational that no person of ordinary prudence would have believed the decision
to have been in the best interests of the corporation.
Id. at 576-77 (citing D. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 77-78 (1989)).
234. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996).
235. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
236. Id. at 953.
237. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 120, at 1068.
238. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)). Title 8, section 141(a)
of the Delaware Code provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as otherwise provided
in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the
certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board
of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2004).
239. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953-54.
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from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate

enterprise,

which includes

stockholders, from harm reasonably

perceived, irrespective of its source.",240 Boards are not required to be
passive instrumentalities of corporate governance24 1 in the face of 242a
threat to corporate policy. Thus, confirming Smith v. Van Gorkom's
mandate that "even in the traditional areas of fundamental corporate
change, i.e., charter amendments ... mergers ... sale of assets ... and
dissolution ... director action is a prerequisite to the ultimate
Although "directors are given
disposition of such matters. ' 43

substantial-but not unlimited-authority to forge corporate strategies,
while leaving room for stockholders to vote down managementpreferred mergers and to use the election process to avail themselves of
a tender offer," 244 the prevailing but at times hazy Unocal- inspired case
law and the relatively clear statutory rules appear largely congruent with
director preeminence in the hierarchy called corporate governance.245
In concert with Unocal's deduction that directors must be given
substantial, if limited authority, the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld
the "most recent defensive mechanism in the arsenal of corporate
takeover weaponry-the Preferred Share Purchase Rights Plan ' 246 in
Moran v. Household International.247 In Moran, an action brought
individually and derivatively, certain shareholders sought to invalidate
the rights plan adopted by the board.24s Denying the plaintiffs
contention that certain Delaware statutory provisions authorizing the
issuance of stock failed to apply within a corporate control contest, the

240. Id. at 954.
241. Id. at 954.
242. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985) (holding that in a merger a
director may not abdicate the duty to act in an informed and deliberate manner).
243. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 n.8 (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888).
244. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 120, at 1081. See also Moran v.
Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) (laying out the causes of action the
court recognized for the right of the shareholder to receive takeover bids is limited by the
defensive tactics taken by the directors), aff'd 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
245. Confusingly, courts are often inconsistent on this score as they express support for both
director and shareholder primacy norms. See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
658-59 (Del. Ch. 1988) (suggesting that shareholders hold ultimate authority as principals).
246. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985). The Rights Plan
provides that Household common stockholders are entitled to the issuance of one Right per
common share under certain triggering conditions. Id. There are two triggering events. Id. The
first is the announcement of a tender offer for 30 percent of Household's shares and the second is
the acquisition of 20 percent of Household's shares by any single entity or group. Id.
247. Id.
248. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1063 (Del. Ch. 1985), affid 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).

1150

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

court declined to limit the directors' authority. 249 The authority to use
poison pills is not absolute because the directors, when they are "faced
with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights, they will not be
able to arbitrarily reject the offer." 250 Without focusing on the

company's corporate charter and its accompanying governance contract,
the court focused on the board's statutory power 25' and common law
default rules connected to the business judgment rule. The court,
accordingly, held that not only was the plan within the board's
authority, but it failed to entrench the board in contravention of their
fiduciary obligations under Unocal's business judgment rule

formulation. 52 Moreover, if the lower court's opinion retains viability,
it is likely that:
[S]hareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover
bids. The shareholders' ability to gain premiums through takeover
activity is subject to the good faith business
judgment of the board of
2 3
directors in structuring defensive tactics.

1

Revlon stressed and reaffirmed Unocal's requirements.254

While

"[t]he ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation falls on its board of directors," 255 consistent with the firm
governance charter, "lock-ups and related agreements are permitted
under Delaware law where their adoption is untainted by director
interest or other breaches of fiduciary duty. 256 Once a company shifts
from resistance to a sale posture, however, the duty of the board is
transformed "from the preservation of [the firm] as a corporate entity to
249. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-55.
250. Id. at 1354.
251. See, e.g., id. at 1351 n.7 (stating that the power to issue rights to purchase shares is
conferred by 8 Del. C. § 157 which provides in relevant part: "[s]ubject to any provisions in the
certificate of incorporation, every corporation may create and issue, whether or not in connection
with the sale of any shares of stock... rights or options ....
");see also id. at 1353 (noting the
inherent powers of the Board conferred by 8 Del. C. § 141(a) provide that the business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
board of directors).
252. Id. at 1356-57.
253. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1070.
254. The Revlon court affirms the following points: (1) "when a board implements antitakeover measures there arises the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders;" (2) the potential for
conflict therefore, "places upon the directors the burden of proving that they had reasonable
grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, a burden satisfied
by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation;" coupled with (3) an affirmative
showing that the action taken was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1980) (citing Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
255. Id. at 179.
256. Id. at 176.
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the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit. 25 7 In such a setting, "the whole question of defensive measures
[becomes] moot. '25 8 The directors cannot be viewed as defenders of
corporate policy, but instead as "auctioneers charged with getting the
best price for stockholders."5 9 Conceding the corporation can no longer
control its destiny, the role of Directors shifts from a concentration on
fundamental operational duties to direct the enterprise as hierarchs who
further both short- and long-run corporate policy and purposes to a new
role as corporate salespersons, acting on behalf of and for the benefit of
equity owners. This determination implies that the board's primary role
is to manage the business for the benefit of a variety of stakeholders and
contract beneficiaries, including shareholders with a view to the longerterm, but when and if the entity is put up for sale, maximizing rather
immediate returns to shareholders should become the directors' focus.
The Revlon court's analysis was primarily driven by its focus on
potential self-interest. As a result, compliance with the board's
fiduciary obligations became a predicate to the deployment of the
business judgment rule assumption. This example indicates that courts
will restrain the board's authority to create certain defensive measures
after a change of control becomes inevitable 260 to safeguard shareholder
interest as the residual claimants and to ensure the responsible exercise
of authority by directors.
After the Revlon decision, Delaware takeover jurisprudence involving
shareholder voting became inextricably intertwined with the Blasius
262 The
framework.26' This development undergoes examination later.
Unitrin case presents a number of developments in addition to its
interaction with, but non-reliance on Blasius, and its accompanying rule
precluding board disenfranchisement of shareholders unless the board
can demonstrate a compelling justification.2 63 One observer contends
that among other things, Unitrin reinforced Time-Warner's flexible
interpretation of substantive coercion that leads to a narrowing of the
scope of Unocal review. 264 The case maintains that "'[b]ecause the
257.
258.

Id. at 182.
Id.

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 885-95 (discussing the
Blasius standard of review and its application).
262. See infra Part llI.C (discussing the interplay between UnocallRevlonlUnitrin and
Blasius).
263. Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Corp., 651 A2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1993).
264. Regan, supra note 207, at 962-68 (contending that Unitrin unnecessarily constrains the
Unocal framework by, among other things, resurrecting the specter of substantive coercion as a
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effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so
powerful and [because its alternative is] the standard of entire fairness
so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial
26
review frequently is determinative of the outcome of [the] litigation.'
Whether the entire fairness test is actually so exacting is a matter of
some debate,266 but in any case, this asserted tension led to the
application of Unocal as a putatively intermediate standard of review
given the facts of the Unitrin case.267
In Unitrin, American General and a parallel class action initiated by
shareholders sought to enjoin a proposed repurchase plan. While the
board did not attempt to amend the corporate charter, it adopted a
poison pill, amended the bylaws to add shark repellent features 268 and
initiated a defensive stock repurchase.26 9
Deeming the latter
unnecessary in light of the poison pill, the Court of Chancery struck this
device as disproportionate in light of the threat posed. 270 The Supreme
Court of Delaware reversed, holding that the "Court of Chancery should
have directed its enhanced scrutiny: first, upon whether the Repurchase
Program the Unitrin Board implemented was draconian, by being either
preclusive or coercive; and second, if it was not draconian, upon
whether it was within the range of reasonable responses to the threat...
272
posed,, 27' as a component part of the multiple defenses adopted.
Conceding the effectiveness of a poison pill (repurchase program) in
conjunction with the longstanding supermajority vote provision in the
Unitrin charter, the Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed with the
Chancellor's conclusion that "the Repurchase Program would operate to
provide the director shareholders with a 'veto' to preclude a successful
threat justifying a defensive response and suggesting that even non-coercive offers can constitute
a threat to shareholder interest).
265. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1371 (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)).
266. See, e.g., Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at
*26-27 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (suggesting that the entire fairness test is consistent with
deferential review and less demanding than the compelling justification standard invoked under
Blasius).
267. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373. Equally true, Unocal can be seen as a conditional version of
the standard business judgment test. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS,
supra note 12, at 703 (discussing Unocal and the business judgment rule); supra Part III
(discussing Unocal).
268. Broadly speaking "[a] shark repellent is an amendment to the firm's articles of
incorporation designed to persuade potential bidders to look elsewhere." BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 677.

269.

Unitrin,651 A.2d at 1366-67.

270. Id. at 1367.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1389.
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'
The court also asserted that
proxy contest by American General."273
Unitrin's efforts would not make American General's attempt to wage a
proxy fight and institute a merger "mathematically impossible or
realistically unattainable, 274 and affirmed the "range of reasonableness"
standard.
Unitrin cautions that robust judicial review of defensive measures
might "involve the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a
275 Although
'better' deal for that of a corporation's board of directors."
this approach contemplates some substantive review by courts, this
view may be quite compatible with the notion of judicial reticence
implied by the traditional version of the business judgment rule. It may
also harmonize with the observation that the "power to hold to account
is ultimately the power to decide. 276 Emphasizing that judicial
deference is generally warranted 27 7 because the board of directors
requires "latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation
278 the
and its shareholders when defending against perceived threat,,
Supreme Court of Delaware held that the "Unitrin Board had the power
and the duty, upon reasonable investigation, to protect Unitrin's
shareholders from what it perceived to be the threat from American
27 9
General's inadequate all-cash for all-shares Offer."
Providing latitude for such decision-making affirms that board action
in responding to a perceived threat can withstand Unocal scrutiny when
2 80
and if the board's conduct falls within the bounds of reasonableness.
Affording such latitude tips the actual judicial balance "towards
authority values even in a context charged with conflicts of interest.
Given the significant conflicts of interest posed by takeovers, courts
recognize the need for some review. But the Delaware courts also
seemingly recognize that their power of review easily could become the
power to decide., 281 Often this struggle entails disputed conceptions of
the scope and application of the business judgment rule. On one
account, the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin framework affirms the "search for

273. Id. at 1380.
274. Id. at 1389.
275. Regan, supra note 207, at 964 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990)).
276. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 108.
277. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1389-90.
280. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 737.
281. Id. But see Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto, supra note 5, at 979 ("[N]one of the
arguments made in favor of board veto, nor all of them combined, provides a basis for concluding
that board veto serves target shareholders.").
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conflicted interests reflects the Delaware court's solution to the
irreconcilable tension between authority and accountability. 2 82 The
result is that "[c]oncem for accountability drives the courts' expectation
that the board will function as a separate institution independent from
and superior to the firm's managers. 283 This paradigm reasons that
only if the directors have "ultimate decision-making authority, rather
284
than incumbent management, will the board's conduct pass muster.,
If and when board conduct is deemed irreproachable, "respect for
authority values will require the court to defer to the board's substantive
decisions. The board has legitimate authority in the takeover context,
just as it has in proxy contests and a host of other decisions that
nominally appear to belong to the shareholders. 2 85
Bainbridge
persuasively contends that the board's authority cannot "be restricted in
this context without impinging on the board's authority elsewhere.
Authority thus cannot be avoided anymore than can accountability; the
task is to come up with a reasonable balance. 286 It is possible that
Unocal as refined by Unitrin strikes the correct balance by allowing the
board of directors latitude in discharging its fiduciary obligations in
compliance with the "range of reasonableness" criterion that allows the
board to act upon reasonable investigation in good faith to protect the
target's shareholders.
However persuasive the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin framework may be,
the Supreme Court of Delaware's recent decision in Omnicare v. NCS
disturbed this scaffold. 2" In that case, in an effort to escape the
tentacles of impending insolvency, which was partially related to the
difficulty in collecting accounts receivables, 288 NCS agreed to merge
with Genesis. Several months after this agreement-but before the
stockholders had an opportunity to vote-the board withdrew its
recommendation. Instead it proposed that the Genesis transaction be

282. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 738.
283. Id. This claim remains largely correct whether one accepts or rejects the claim that as a
practical matter, the Unocal framework has "been reduced to the vitally important-but
incomplete--task of ensuring that the shareholders retain the ability to remove their board of
directors through the proxy machinery." See, e.g., Regan, supra note 207, at 970 (contending that
the Unocal framework has been reduced).
284. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 738.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. 2003). In "NCS

Healthcare, Inc. ("NCS"), a Delaware corporation, was the object of competing acquisition bids,
one by Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. ("Genesis"), a Pennsylvania corporation, and the other by
Omnicare Inc., ("Omnicare") a Delaware corporation." Id
288. Id. at 920.
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29
rejected in favor of a purportedly superior transaction with Omnicare.
The dispute in the case is grounded in a number of provisions within the
initial merger agreement, which were authorized by Section 251 (c) of
the DGCL.29°
One disputed provision mandated that the Genesis transaction be put
to a shareholder vote, even if the NCS board no longer recommended it.
Additionally, the NCS board omitted any effective fiduciary clause.
Two shareholders who collectively held a majority of voting power
agreed unconditionally to vote all of their shares in favor of the Genesis
merger. Effectively, "the combined terms of the voting agreements and
merger agreement guaranteed, ab initio, that the transaction proposed by
291
These
Genesis would obtain NCS stockholder's approval."
financial
NCS's
the
of
exigency
the
by
part
in
driven
were
agreements
lost a bidding war with
situation but also by the fact that Genesis
292
NCS was provoked by prior
Omnicare in a different transaction.
negotiations with Omnicare, which failed to satisfy its objective of
providing NCS shareholders with some financial consideration should
the various merger/transaction/proposals be consummated particularly
29 3
in light of its more recent financial improvement.
The most highly contested provision within the merger agreement,
however, was a stipulation preventing NCS from entering into
discussions with third parties concerning an alternative acquisition of
NCS or providing non-public information to such parties, unless: (1)
the third-party provided an unsolicited, bona fide written proposal; (2)
the NCS board believed in good faith that the proposal provided
superior terms; and (3) before providing non-public information, the
third-party would execute a confidentiality agreement consistent with
294
the terms of the one already in place between NCS and Genesis.
Disagreeing with the Court of Chancery's determination that "the
voting agreements, when coupled with the provision in the Genesis
merger agreement requiring that it be presented to the stockholders for a
vote pursuant to 8 Delaware Code § 251 (c), constituted defensive

289. Id. at 918 ("The competing Omnicare bid offered the NCS stockholders an amount of
cash equal to more than twice the then current market value of the shares to be received in the
Genesis merger. [It] also treated the NCS corporation's other stakeholders on equal terms with

the Genesis agreement.").
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 926.
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'
measures within the meaning of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,"295
the Supreme Court of Delaware held "that in the absence of an effective
fiduciary out clause, [the] defensive measures are both preclusive and
coercive. '
Hence, the "defensive measures are invalid and
unenforceable. 297 More importantly, defendant Jon Outcalt, Chairman
of the NCS board, owned 202,063 shares of NCS Class A common
stock and 3.5 million shares of Class B common stock.29 8 Defendant
Kevin B. Shaw, President, CEO, and a director of NCS, owned 28,905
shares of NCS Class A common stock and 1.14 million shares of Class
B common stock.299 One issue was whether Omnicare had standing
with respect to (1) its fiduciary duty breach claims 3°° and (2) its claim
that "the NCS charter should be interpreted to cause an automatic
conversion of Outcalt and Shaw's Class B stock (with ten votes per
share) to Class A stock (with one vote per share)."3 1 Both the Chancery
and Supreme Court of Delaware agreed that Omnicare had standing
with respect to the automatic stock conversion issue. The fiduciary duty
issue remained alive, in part, because of a class action initiated by
certain NCS stockholders to enjoin the merger. 02 While the Court of
Chancery held that Omnicare had standing to challenge the validity of
the voting agreements, the lower court reached a decision adverse to
Omnicare's interest.3 3
Asserting that "[t]he 'defining tension' in corporate governance today
has been characterized as 'the tension between deference to directors'
decisions and the scope of judicial review,"'3 4 the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court of Delaware began by presuming that the business
judgment rule assumption provides the initial standard of review.3 5
Suggesting that "[u]nder normal circumstances, neither the courts nor
the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decision of the
directors," 3°6 the court accepted that certain circumstances mandate that
courts take a more active role in supervising "decisions made and

295.

Id. at 918.

296. Id
297. Id.
298. Id.

299. Id. at918-19.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 919.
Id. at 919-20.
Id.at 920.
Id.
Id. at 927.
Id.
Id. at 928.
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actions taken by directors."30 7 Adverting first to the Unocal/Revlon
scaffold, the court accepted that the Unocal analysis applies in a variety
of circumstances, including a change of control or where the target firm
initiates an active bidding process.30 8 Thus, the court assumed,
arguendo, that the business judgment rule applies to the NCS's decision
to merge with Genesis. The deal protection devices designed to enforce
3°9 because
this agreement, however, required enhanced scrutiny
"Delaware corporation law expressly provides for a balance of power
between boards and stockholders which makes merger transactions a
The absence of an
shared enterprise and ownership decision."31
the board from
prevented
effective fiduciary out clause purportedly
discharging its fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders and
alternatively was seen as preclusive and coercive.311 As a result, the
objectionable provisions became unenforceable as illustrated by
Unocal.
This process again raises the "critical distinction between 'enterprise'
decisions-whether they be routine or extraordinary-and 'ownership'
312 But in
decisions-particularly those involving contests for control.
the context of this case, directors motivated to salvage some financial
return for shareholders from an imminently insolvent entity find their
enterprise decision eviscerated by the Supreme Court of Delaware's
holding that re-characterizes the board's decision as an ownership one.
While the dissent lucidly disagrees with this assessment by
concentrating on whether the board's conduct can be seen as in the best
3 13
was agreed to,
interest of the entity at the time the transaction
ownership decision-making, according to the majority, apparently and
easily fits the property model, suggesting shareholder primacy
safeguarded by intrusive judicial review. The majority's conclusions in
concert with Blasius may combine to shift the court's focus to
accountability worries and thus to severely constrain board discretion
formerly and properly protected by the business judgment rule.
B. Protecting the Franchise
It seems clear that collective action problems described in Part II, and
as amplified by Bainbridge, prevent the shareholder from exercising
307.
308.

Id.
Id. at 929.

309. Id.
310. Id. at 930.
311. Id. at936.
312. Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 574.
313. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939-46 (Veasey, J., dissenting).
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meaningful day-to-day control over firm decisions.1 4 Equally true,
shareholder claims including their voting rights are freely transferable
and thus vesting the right to vote in the hands of the firm's shareholders
makes possible the market for corporate control and provides a vehicle
to minimize shirking by the firm's agents.1 5 Consistent with this
conclusion, a board may erect takeover defenses that deter certain types
of bids, but broadly speaking, the board must leave some mechanism by
which the bidder can present and offer to the shareholders.3 16
Apparently, this view led to the Delaware rule that a "board may not
erect takeover defenses that disenfranchise its shareholders without a
'compelling justification. '",317
1. The Blasius Rule
In a decision preceding Unitrin, the Delaware court suggested that
the Unocal/Revlon framework could be seen as insufficiently rigorous:
"The plaintiff, Blasius Industries, the largest stockholder of Atlas
Corporation proposed to management that Atlas engage in a series of
transactions involving a leveraged recapitalization and a distribution of
cash to shareholders. 31 8 After the Atlas board failed to adopt the
proposal, Blasius Industries attempted to take control of the Atlas board
through bylaw amendments to expand the board to the maximum
number allowable under the Atlas charter. 3 9 To prevent this, the Atlas
board voted to amend the bylaws to increase the size of the board from
seven to nine and appointed two individuals to fill those newly created
positions.32 ° It was the board's intent that the newly appointed
directors-consistent with the Certificate of Incorporation-would
serve staggered terms, 321 thereby reducing the likelihood of a swift
takeover. The board's amendment power was appropriately grounded
in the corporate charter, but its timing was suspect. Despite testimony
in support of "the proposition that, in acting [when it did] the board was

314. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 470.
315. Id. ("[Iff management fails to maximize the shareholders' residual claim, an outsider can

profit by purchasing a majority of the shares and voting out the incumbent board of directors.").
316. Id. at 683.

317. Id. at 683 n.9. (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995);
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A2d
651 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
318. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, Recent Development in Judicial Review of
Interference with Stockholder Franchise: Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore (2000), available at
http://library.findlaw.con2000/May/l/129400.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
319. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 654.
320. Id. at 655.
321. Id.

2005]

Director Primacy and Corporate Governance

1159

principally motivated simply to implement a plan to expand the Atlas
board that preexisted ... the emergence of Blasius as an active
shareholder, ' ' 322 an alternative view implies that the board "was
principally motivated to prevent or delay the shareholders from possibly
placing a majority of new members on the board .. 323 Although it
seems clear that the Atlas corporate governance charter provides the
board with authority to act in the manner intended to protect
shareholders from the risk associated with Blasius Industries' proposal,
the possible existence of a dual motivation for the board action and its
suspect timing led to more exacting scrutiny than required by Unocal.
Although Unocal and its progeny teach that
"[c]orporate boards are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny when
they respond to circumstances portending a potential change of control
of the corporation... [Blasius] articulated an even higher standard of
scrutiny where a board's actions have,,324the primary purpose of
but not
particularly
impairing the stockholder franchise,'
32 5
directors.
the
of
election
the
of
context
the
in
exclusively
In practice, "lawyers are often consumed by the question of the
defendant's motive or purpose. They sometimes fail to appreciate that
courts make an equally important inquiry into whether the defendant's
326
'
In
action, whatever its purpose, had the proscribed effect."
subsequent cases decided under the Blasius doctrine, the conduct
predicate becomes a question of whether or not the action at issue
precludes or delays "the effectuation of an imminent shareholder vote or
practically [prevents] or severely [prejudices] pending or proposed
shareholder action, [even if] not imminent. 312 7 Declining to adopt a per
se rule invalidating such conduct, because such a rule might sweep too
broadly, the Blasius court instituted a two-part test: (1) a board
manipulation of the election machinery to thwart or dilute the voting
power of certain shareholders, and (2) that the burden of persuasion
falls on the board to demonstrate a compelling justification for its
conduct.3 28 This proposition explicitly incorporates robust (non-

322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 320.
325. The Blasius issue evidently also applies outside of the context of an election of directors.
See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660 (stating that the allocation of power between directors and
shareholders is at issue in "every instance in which an incumbent board seeks to thwart a
shareholder majority").
326. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics
of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927, 930 (2001).
327. Id. (emphasis added).
328. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661-62; see also Joshua L. Vineyard, Let (Corporate) Freedom
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deferential) fiduciary duty analysis by suggesting that an action "taken
in good faith... [may constitute] an unintended violation of the duty of
loyalty. 329
Furthermore, the Blasius court contends that the question "posed is
not one of intentional wrong (or even negligence), but one of authority
as between the fiduciary and the beneficiary...,3 which suggests that
the non-deferential business judgment paradigm can and will be used to
constrain directors' authority even when grounded in both their
statutory remit and the firm's charter. Borrowing from Bainbridge's
discussion of the business judgment rule in a duty of care context, it is
possible that on one level the court's approach is consistent with the
modem restatement of the business judgment rule signifying that
"[d]irectors who violate their duty of care [or any one of the other triads
of fiduciary duty] do not get the protections of the business judgment
rule; indeed, the rule is rebutted by a showing that the directors violated
their fiduciary duty of 'due care' ' 33 1 or loyalty. Unfortunately this
conception "is exactly backwards. 33 2 An alternative understanding of
the business judgment rule "prevents plaintiff from litigating that very
issue,
because the courts "refrain from reviewing board decisions
unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied. 334
The Blasius court clearly goes further by permitting liability to attach
even where the board acts in good faith, without selfish motivation, in
apparent compliance with its duty of care, but to thwart implementation
of a plan that it feared might (within its business judgment) cause great
injury.335 Injury took the form of a risky, highly leveraged restructuring
33 6
proposal that was inconsistent with ongoing corporate policy.
Doctrinally, if a breach of the duty of loyalty requires intent, then a
board decision that nevertheless exhibits conformity with the triads of
their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty, and due care-and remains
motivated by a commitment to defensible corporate policy, would still
Ring: Reaffirming the Importance of the ShareholderFranchise in State of Wisconsin Investment
Board v. PeerlessSystems Corporation,71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1443, 1451 (2003).
329. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (emphasis added). The Blasius proposition continues to be
restated and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d
75, 92 (Del. 1992) (noting that the standards of review of both Stahl and Blasius arise from
questions of divided loyalty and are well-settled).
330. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
331. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 152, at 94-95.
332. Id. at 95.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 87.
335. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
336. Id. at 654 (noting that the Blasius Group proposed a highly-leveraged recapitalization).
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fail to receive the protections of the business judgment rule.
Alternatively, if a breach of duty of loyalty can be grounded in
unintentional conduct, then judicial interference becomes plausible
under virtually any set of circumstances.
Against this backdrop, one can discover a persistent shareholder
preference against judicial intervention. This preference, however,
extends only to board decisions motivated by a desire to maximize
shareholder wealth. Where the directors' decision is motivated by
considerations other than shareholder wealth, as where the directors
engage in self-dealing or seek to defraud the shareholders, however,
the question33 7is no longer one of honest error but of intentional
misconduct.
This is unequivocally missing in Blasius. By contrast, in cases where
strong self-interest exists, "[d]espite the limitations of judicial review,
rational shareholders would prefer judicial intervention with respect to
board decisions so tainted. 338
Either direct or unarticulated misconceptions about the necessity of
an aggressive conception of accountability based on a preference for
shareholder control, coupled with a concurrent focus on the defendant
corporation's motives, possibly lead to the truncation of board authority
As
and discretion without the necessary predicate: self-interest.
exercise
to
Bainbridge notes, "directors are vested with wide powers
their discretion by fiat, those powers are limited by their contractual
obligations-both explicit and implied in law-to the factors of
production with whom they contract."3 3 9 Clearly, the protection of
shareholders' contract rights fits within this paradigm but does not
necessarily admit that Blasius provides either the best-or even an
intelligible-solution. This is particularly true since in Blasius, the
charter explicitly confirmed the board's authority to engage in the
stagger the board and to therefore effectively
prohibited conduct-to
340
itself.
entrench
One might attempt to justify the Blasius decision "even though the
shareholders opted for a charter-staggered board, [because] the directors
undermined the shareholders' commitment to this form of governance
by failing to appoint a sufficient number of directors to make the choice
effective" 34 before the disputed election contest. Kahan and Rock
suggest that because of this, the "directors cannot redress their mistake
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 152, at 122-23.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 103.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 514.
Id. at 515.
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once the choice actually matters, that is, once a contest for control
begins. ' 3 2 Nevertheless, a robust commitment to the Blasius criteria,
particularly where self-interest remains essentially absent 343 and where
the directors act in accord with explicitly agreed upon authority, may
extirpate desirable judicial reticence and emasculate the determination
that "[c]ontrol belongs to a board of directors that is legally independent
of shareholders, managers, employees, and all other corporate
participants.
Taken together, a Blasius-inspired approach may
eviscerate the integrity of the structure provided by the corporate
form.3 " Blasius, properly understood, allows insufficient latitude to
directors in discharging their fiduciary obligations. Implicitly, if not
explicitly, elevated inspection raises the specter of a restricted
interpretation of the business judgment rule that might, under certain
circumstances, discourage beneficial risk-taking. Although one might
assert that the challenged conduct at issue implicates suspect timing, as
a general matter, accountability mechanisms must be found that are
capable of correcting errors, a frequently invoked and sufficiently strict
organ of accountability can easily amount to a denial of board discretion
that shifts power if decision-making to judges. 34
2. Blasius's Progeny in a Takeover Setting
The law firm Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft notes, in its recent
treatise on corporate governance, that on several occasions, "Delaware
courts have dealt with the application of the Blasius standard of review
in cases where Unocal would also govern.I34 6 Often a hostile tender
offer is coupled with a proxy contest or alternatively with a consent
solicitation. Such maneuvers can interfere with shareholder voting.347
Furthermore, the authors state that "in these cases, it is difficult to
distinguish a board's legitimate attempt to counter a hostile tender offer,
which is governed by the Unocal (and Unitrin) standard, with an
impermissible attempt to impede stockholder voting, which is reviewed
under the more rigorous Blasius standard. 348 If the Blasius model is
sustainable, board motivation is likely to be some combination of proper

342. Id.
343. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 318 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing
Chancellor Allen's opinion in Blasius). Whatever strict scrutiny means, this review is required
even where a good faith belief rather than entrenchment motives drives the board's actions. Id.
344. Id. at 318-19.
345. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 152, at 109.
346. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
347. Id.

348. Id.
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and improper motives leading to ambiguity. Ambiguity grounded in
motivational ambivalence, or in judicial preferences to defer to
shareholders or the court's own judgment, unavoidably anticipates
judicial intervention. This approach presents difficulties that implicate
the appropriate locus of control. Thus, courts have had difficulty in
applying Blasius, and consequently consistent applications of its
holding are rare.
Evidently, in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., Chancellor Allen applied a
narrow reading to his Blasius decision." 349 The Chancellor declined to
invoke Blasius but upheld the board's action under Unocal. 350
Similarly, Kidsco v. Dinsmore provides support for the conclusion that
some board interference with the shareholder franchise is allowable
without triggering a Blasius review.351 Since the court determined that
the primary purpose of the board's action was not calculated to prevent
effective shareholder action, and since the court accepted the board's
argument that its decision to delay the proxy contest was not motivated
by a desire to entrench itself, the court considered Blasius but declined
to apply it.352 Instead, it applied Unocal in upholding the board's
action.353
Correspondingly, in H.F. Ahmanson & C. v. Great Western Financial
Corp., the chancery court declined to apply Blasius, relying instead on
Unocal.354 Responding to a hostile bid by Ahmanson & Co., the Great
Western board cancelled the company's annual stockholders' meeting
and rescheduled the meeting causing a delay of fifty days while entering
'
Because the court
into a merger agreement with a "white knight."355
determined that the directors' decision did not frustrate the effective and
substantive exercise of the shareholders' franchise in light of the threat
posed, the court sustained the delay by applying Unocal as explicated
349. Id. In Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Chancellor Allen allowed the board to defer to the
planned date, but not to the declared date of the annual meeting in response to a thirty percent
stockholder's announced tender offer and planned proxy contest.
350. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1117-20 (Del. Ch. 1990). See Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318 (discussing Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc.)
351. Kidsco v.Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 495 (Del. Ch. 1995).
352. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
353. Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 496 (stating "[o]ur case law clearly establishes that board action
[amending the by-laws to give the board an additional 25 days to call a shareholder-initiated
special meeting], when taken as a defensive measure against a hostile tender offer coupled with a
proxy contest, does not implicate the Blasius standard of review").
354. H.F. Ahmanson & C. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., No. 15650, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84, *1
(Del. Ch. June 3, 1997).
355. Id. at *2, *57-58. A white knight is a "person or entity friendly to the target company
STEPHEN M.
which makes a tender offer in competition to that of the initial bidder."
BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS 17 (2003).
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356
by Unitrin.
These decisions signify the judicial resistance to deploying Blasius.
For example, Allen explains that, "U]udicial reluctance to surface the
difficult policy choices . . . often manifests itself in elision, that is, the
tendency for courts to omit or blur the distinctions between
contradictory ideas. 357 Unvaryingly, with this perspective, the Supreme
Court of Delaware, in Williams v. Geier, accepted certain boardsponsored amendments to the firm's certificate of incorporation.3 58
When pursuant to a recommendation of directors, shareholders actually
vote on a charter amendment and recapitalization plan granting "a form
of 'tenure voting' whereby holders of common stock on the record date
would receive ten votes per share . .. [but] [u]pon sale or other transfer,
however, each share would revert to one-vote-per-share status until that
share is held by its owner for three years., 359 Although the Williams
plan purportedly favored the majority group of shareholders at the
expense of others, the affirmative shareholder vote provided the court
with a reason to avoid resolving the possible tension 36° between Blasius
and the practical necessity that authority be wielded by directors
particularly where such authority is attached to the firm's charter.
Citing Stroud, the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to analyze the
disputed conduct through the lens of the "compelling justification"
criterion, particularly because it imposed an onerous, even harsh
burden.36' Citing Aronson v. Lewis3 62 with approval, it employed "the
traditional [business judgment] review of disinterested and independent
director action in recommending ...the vote of the stockholders in
approving, the Amendment and resulting recapitalization. 3 63 The lower
court applied Unocal and relied on the claim that the plan was
reasonably calculated to impede a corporate threat in the form of
corporate raiders. 364 Finding a "rational business purpose," the Supreme
Court of Delaware did not find any evidence suggesting a primary
purpose to impede the Milacron stockholders' vote with respect to the

356. H.F. Ahmanson, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84, at *56 ("Because Blasius is inapplicable, the
appropriate standard of review is set forth in Unocal,as explicated by Unitrin.").
357. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 121, at 1070.
358. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).
359. Id. at 1370.
360. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 121, at 1070-71.
361. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376.
362. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
363. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1377. See Vineyard, supra note 328, at 1453-54 (discussing the
Williams decision).
364. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1371 (affirming but for different reasons).
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firm's recapitalization plan.16' Despite the determination that "the
Amendment received less than 50 percent of the votes of all the
unaffiliated shares outstanding, 366 the court ruled that neither Unocal
nor Blasius was applicable because the board's action was neither
unilateral nor "an act of disenfranchisement. '3 67 In sum, the Supreme
Court of Delaware found that judicial reticence connected to the
business judgment rule applies to the action of the independent majority
of the board in recommending the advisability of the amendment to the
Milacron stockholders and since a fully informed majority of the
stockholders voted in favor of the amendment pursuant to "the statutory
authority of 8 Del. C. § 242 ...the stockholder vote is dispositive. 365
Whether the court's analysis is factually correct or not, this case
confirms that accountability was primarily at issue. Since the court
found that the plaintiff had adduced insufficient evidence to rebut "the
presumption of the business judgment rule,, 36 9 the dispute is largely
tested via deferential review. Thus, the Williams court failed to find any
breach of the Milacron board's fiduciary duty. 370 This decision confirms
that shareholder approval of board initiated conduct acts as an
additional barrier to intrusive judicial scrutiny.
The dissent maintained a different perspective:
The question is what is the appropriate standard of review to be
employed by the Court of Chancery in reviewing the Milacron
Recapitalization Plan that was approved by a vote of the shareholders
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 242, the effect of which will inevitably
detriment of
entrench the majority stockholders, to the ultimate
371
minority stockholder who did not approve the Plan.
Since the "[p]lan implicates the duty of loyalty, 37 2 confers unequal
benefits on the majority shareholders' group, 373 and since the intended
beneficiaries of the plan own a majority of the outstanding stock
365. Id. The court found that beyond any desire to obstruct the shareholders' voting rights,
among the goals of the recapitalization were the promotion of long-term value by the
enhancement of voting rights of long-term shareholders, the ability to issue additional shares of
common stock for financing or other purposes with minimal dilution of voting rights of long-term
shareholders, and the discouragement of hostile takeovers. Id. at 1376.
366. Id. at 1374.
367. Id. at 1377.
368. Id. at 1371.
369. Id. at 1377-78.
370. See id. at 1378 (finding that the business judgment rule presumption is not rebutted by
simply showing that Geier family owned a dominant stock interest); see also Vineyard, supra
note 328, at 1454 (discussing the holding and reasoning of the Williams court).
371. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1385 (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
372. Id. at 1386 (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
373. Id. (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
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virtually assuring approval, the outcome of a shareholder vote could
neither serve to immunize the board's decision, nor "lessen judicial
scrutiny into the reasonableness of the plan and its fairness to the
minority shareholders. 3 74 The dissent further stated that, "the action of
the Milacron Board in instituting and recommending adoption of the
Recapitalization Plan implicates the duty of loyalty and therefore, must
be subject to full judicial scrutiny, not to judicial deference because of
'
the business judgment rule."375
More importantly, the dissent agreed
with the fairly obvious conclusion that the franchise can permissibly be
diluted "where reasonably necessary to accomplish an appropriate
'
corporate business policy."376
Nevertheless, the dissent relied largely on
the Unocal/Stroud framework as refined by Blasius37 7 to reach a
decision that differs substantially from the majority view.
Because the shareholders vote approving the plan was essentially
meaningless, the dissent's perspective leans heavily on an
accountability calculus that constrains board discretion. In the dissent's
account, board proposals to reduce the voting power of minority
shareholders are required to jump though an elevated gauntlet, even if
the proposal complies with the technical mandates of the appropriate
statute.378 Since the dissent must concede that virtually all board
decisions in the anti-takeover arena involve some actual or potential
conflicts of interest, and since the issue of control was not concurrently
at issue, its concern for the viability of future proxy contests or future
tender offers engineered by hostile bidders implies one of two
alternative viewpoints: (1) that even minority shareholders must retain
some decision-making power because they are principals; or (2) judicial
scrutiny is necessary to protect shareholders' contract rights, even
where the alleged impingement is unlikely to have any substantive
effect on later contests for control because even minority shareholders
retain rights as property owners to share in any potential control premia.
Neither option is necessarily persuasive. Since the benefits of the
disputed plan allegedly favor the controlling group and since this group
is neither interested in giving up control nor required by law to do so,
the dissent's view implies, contrary to earlier precedent, that
shareholders possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids.379
374. Id. (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
375. Id. (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
376. Id. at 1387 (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
377. See id. at 1386-89 (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance
on Stroud and affirming the analysis under Blasius).
378. Id. at 1387 (Hartnett & Horsey, JJ. dissenting).
379. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985) (stating that
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The Carmody v. Toll Brothers case involved a challenge to the Toll
Brothers' adoption of a Rights Plan coupled with a "dead hand" feature
that "authorizes only a specific, defined category of directors-the
'Continuing Directors'-to redeem the Rights."' 0 The Rights Plan
contained both a dilutive mechanism triggered by a certain defined
event as well as flip-in and flip-over features38 ' aimed at dissuading a
hostile acquirer from attempting a takeover.3 82 The purported purpose
of the Rights Plan was "to protect [Toll Brother's] stockholders from
coercive or unfair tactics to gain control of the Company by placing the
stockholders in a position of having to accept or reject an unsolicited
,,381
While iitis settled law "that a corporate
offer without adequate time.
board could permissibly adopt a poison pill, the next litigated question
became: under what circumstances would the directors' fiduciary duties
require the3 84board to redeem the right in the face of a hostile takeover
proposal?
In general, Delaware courts are reluctant to order the redemption of
poison pills based on fiduciary duty claims because a persistent bidder
can defeat the pill by initiating a tender offer and simultaneously
soliciting shareholder proxies aimed at replacing incumbent board
members with the bidder's nominees. The nominees can then simply
redeem the pill after taking office.3 85 Hence, it is clear that some
mechanism exists, which allows for a change of control.386 The "dead
hand" changed everything. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
that the board violated its duty of loyalty because: (a) the 'dead hand'
provision was enacted solely or primarily for entrenchment purposes;
(b) it was also a disproportionate defensive measure, since it precludes
the shareholders from receiving tender offers and engaging in a proxy
context ...and (c) the 'dead hand' provision purposefully interferes
control over proxy machinery does not involve a contractual right of shareholders), affid 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
380. Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1998).
381. See BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS, supra note 355, at 317 (defining a flipover as a shareholder rights plan that is triggered following the acquisition of a specified
percentage of the target's common stock which gives target shareholders the option to purchase
acquiring company shares at a steep discount to the market which causes dilution for the bidder's
pre-existing shareholders and may have undesirable effects on the bidder's balance sheet). A flipin plan grants target shareholders rights which become exercisable upon a triggering event. The
flip-in enables shareholders of the target company to purchase target stock at a steep discount.
Often flip-in plans are adopted in tandem with flip-over plans. Id. at 321.
382. Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1183-84.
383. Id. at 1183.
384. Id. at 1186.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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with the shareholder voting franchise without any compelling

justification ....387
Although Delaware law precludes equity investors from having a
legally enforceable right to sell their interest without board approval, the
chancery court sustained all three counts of the complaint, including
both the Blasius-based fiduciary duty claims388 as well as the
Unocal/Unitrin fiduciary duty claim. 389 Nevertheless, because the
Unocal/Unitrin framework is adequate, it is doubtful that Blasius
review can be seen as outcome-determinative.
Since the facts of the case did not implicate control,39 ° the chancery
court had no occasion to confront takeover concerns in the next case.
Hence, State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. Peerless Systems
Corp.,391 is included within this subsection for analytical and
comparative purposes. In Peerless, the plaintiff asserted that the
"defendants inequitably, and in breach of their fiduciary duties
interfered with and manipulated the voting at the Annual Meeting and
deprived Peerless shareholders of their voting rights '

392

when the

Chairman adjourned and then reconvened the meeting to facilitate
passage of an option plan. Although the adjournment is consistent with
section 9 of the Company's Amended and Restated By-Laws,3 93 the
court reconsidered the firm's conduct in connection with Proposal 2 "to
add 1,000,000 shares to the Peerless stock option plan.

394

The court

determined that Blasius review was required where there was no
"formal board action approving the [contested] adjournment [and] it is
undisputed that Peerless took action through its CEO, director, and codefendant Galvadon. 395 Thus, Galvadon assumed the position normally
reserved for the board in these situations.
Under the Blasius review, the court first considered whether Peerless
and Galvadon breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty by adjourning the
annual meeting without closing the polls on Proposal 2.396 Second,
387.
388.

Id. at 1189-90 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1194.

389. Id.
at 1195.
390. In re The MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674-75 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(noting that "when the matter to be voted on does not touch.on issues of directorial control, courts
will apply the exacting Blasius standard sparingly").
391. Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch.LEXIS 170, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
392. Id. at *2.

393. Id. at *9.
394. Id. at *2.
395. Id. at *22.
396. Id. at *23.
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tying interference with voting-rights to the ideological underpinning of
directorial power and accompanying fiduciary duties in a takeover
contest, the court stated that the board derives its power from
shareholders and cannot interfere with the shareholder vote without
collapsing the distinction between the principal (stockholders) and the
Agency theory is also suggestive of the
agent (directors).3 97
Finding a
shareholder's penultimate decision-making authority.
primary purpose to interfere with or impede the exercise of the
shareholder franchise, the court398 declined to apply deferential business
judgment review and also declined to examine the adjournment under
3 99 By denying
the rubric of entire fairness as proposed by the defendant.
deferential review, the court increased the possibility that the plaintiff
might succeed, because when deferential review is applied, "an attack
on a fully informed majority decision to ratify a disputed action or
transaction 'normally must fail. ' '' 400 Equally possible, the court may
have accepted the implications of the principal-agent paradigm as well
as the modem version of the business judgment rule, implying that the
court should substitute its judgment for that of the directors as a general
matter. Equally important, the court contends that "Blasius sets forth a
relatively simple, yet extremely powerful two-part test based on the
duty of loyalty. ' 0 '
Whether denying or embracing deferential review, "Delaware courts
have struggled with the question of whether and how Blasius should be
applied in cases involving defensive responses that impact on
shareholder voting rights. ' °2 Should Blasius "be treated as standard of
review independent of Unocal or should the Blasius analysis be
incorporated within the framework of Unocal?"4 3 The recurrent specter
of ambiguity coupled with judicial reluctance may imply difficulty with
both actual shareholder control and the practical implications of a
capacious conception of corporate democracy. Nonetheless, in applying
Blasius under these circumstances, the Peerless court seems to tip the
balance toward accountability values including shareholder control as a
component of its conception of the proper parameters of its principalagent model, or, alternatively, the court reifies accountability values
397. Id. at *24-25.
398. Id. at *40-41.
399. Id. at *26-27.
400. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (quoting Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591,
593 (Del. Ch. 1958)).
401. Peerless, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *27.
402. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
403. Id.
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based on its desire to protect shareholder property rights in control
premia.
The Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore opinion once again "confronted the
ambiguity of precedent and attempted to reconcile the issue of Blasius'
4°4 during
status in the context of Unoca1"
a control contest. 5 The
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore decision confirms that reluctance in
deploying Blasius can be overcome while corroborating the inference
that the actual outcome of a case would not necessarily change if
Blasius review vanished. This case involved a control contest between
two corporations in the specialty packaging industry. The plaintiff,
Chesapeake Corporation, and the defendant, Shorewood Packaging
Corporation, and both boards of directors believed that the companies
should be merged.4 °6 The boards disagreed "on which company should
acquire the other and who should manage the resulting entity.
However, they recognized that it was susceptible of being devoured by
Chesapeake "through a contested tender offer or proxy fight, the
Shorewood board adopted a host of defensive bylaws to supplement
Shorewood's [existing] poison pill."' ' 4 8 The purpose of this activity was
evident: the new bylaws "were designed to make it more difficult for
Chesapeake to amend the Shorewood bylaws to eliminate its classified
board structure, unseat the director-defendants, and install a new board
amenable to its offer."40
The court's concentration on the mathematical impossibility that the
hostile bidder might prevail indicates that the board conduct falls
outside the "range of reasonableness" rhetoric of Unitrin.
Chesapeake, which later purchased more than fourteen percent of

404. Id.
405. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296 (Del. Ch.2000).

406. Id.
407. Id.
408.

Id.

409. Id. at 296.
These bylaws, among other things, eliminated the ability of stockholders to call special
meetings and gave the Shorewood board control over the record date for any consent

solicitation.
Most important, the bylaws raised the votes required to amend the bylaws from a
simply majority to 66 2/3% of the outstanding shares. Because Shorewood's
management controls nearly 24% of the company's stock, the 66 2/3% Supermajority
Bylaw made it mathematically impossible for Chesapeake to prevail in a consent
solicitation without management's support, assuming a 90% turnout ....
Shortly before trial, the Shorewood Board amended the Bylaw to reduce the required

vote to 60%.
Id. at 296-97.
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Shorewood's outstanding stock,4 1° challenged the Supermajority
Bylaw's validity on several grounds: (1) that the Shorewood board,
dominated by inside directors, without informed deliberations, adopted
the Bylaw to entrench itself; (2) the Bylaw provision raised the
"required vote to unattainable levels and is grossly disproportionate to
the modest threat posed;" and (3) "the defendants' argument that the
Bylaw is necessary to protect Shorewood's sophisticated stockholder
base, which is comprised predominately of institutional investors and
management holders, from the risk of confusion is wholly pretextual
and factually unsubstantiated. ' 411 Chesapeake's argument can be
broken down as follows: (A) that the Supermajority Bylaw was
intended to have and did have the effect of disenfranchising Chesapeake
and precluded it from conducting a successful consent solicitation; (B)
and (C) that the
that the Shorewood board was trying to entrench itself;
412
that the
Noting
decisions.
board was uniformed in rendering its
assertion that "substantive coercion can be invoked by a [target]
corporate board in almost every situation," 4 and that therefore, the use
of this threat as a justification for aggressive defensive measures could
easily be abused,4 14 the chancery court found that defendants failed to
meet "their burden to sustain the Supermajority Bylaw under either the
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. or Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp.
standards of review." 415
e41 6
More specifically, finding the proscribed effect present because the
board raised the required shareholder vote to unattainable levels, the
"court reviewed Blasius and its progeny to determine the circumstances
under which the compelling justification standard should be applied and
4 7
the relationship between the Blasius and Unocal standards.
410. Id. at 311.
411. Id. at 297.
412. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
413. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 327.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 297.
416. Evidently,
[the] proscribed effect of thwarting a shareholder vote or impeding the shareholder
franchise has been found in two types of cases . .. The first type of case involves a
board's attempt to interfere with an imminent shareholder action. In the second type of
case, the threatened or proposed shareholder action is not imminent, but the board
action effectively precludes the shareholders from obtaining their objectives, at least
until the next election.
McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 930. It is argued that "[clases involving the second type of
conduct are more numerous." Id. at 931.
417. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318. See also Chesapeake, 771 A.2d
at 317-24 (analyzing whether the Blasius or Unocal standard should apply).
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Although Shorewood unconvincingly asserted that Supermajority
Bylaw was not preclusive, the real debate is grounded in whether
Blasius adds anything to judicial review, which is not already cabined
by Unocal and its progeny. The Chesapeake court citing Blasius, and
despite evidence suggesting a possible fiduciary duty violation
implicating Unocal, contended that the real issue is authority-not
entrenchment-involving the "'allocation, between shareholders as a
class and the board, of effective power with respect to the governance of
the corporation."' 4 If correct, an unrestrained understanding of the
Blasius framework offers a tempting basis for enhancing shareholder
authority. Even so, such authority is provisional and not absolute. The
Chesapeake opinion noted that the Blasius court declined to advance a
per se rule precluding every board action taken for the "'primary
purpose of thwarting the exercise of a shareholder vote, ' ' 41 9 hence the
compelling justification defense. The compelling justification standard
provides a theoretical escape valve, but once the circumstances require
Blasius review, it is doubtful that defendant boards can prevent judicial
reversal of their conduct. Nevertheless, while proponents of Blasius
contend that directors are not Platonic masters42 -leaving open the
question of who can actually manage and control the corporation ripe
for further scholarly and judicial debate-it is possible that in practical
terms Blasius adds little to the Unocal framework except to buttress
claims unavoidably attached to principal-agent theory that directors are
merely wardens of shareholder control. This scheme tips the scales
towards presumptive judicial review and away from judicial abstention
concerning conduct that appears consistent with board authority.
C. The Interplay Between Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin and Blasius Review.
Assessing the interplay between the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin
framework and the Blasius criterion is an admittedly messy enterprise.
This is true because neither the circumstances nor the judicial language
supplied by the courts in this arena is separable into tidy categories.
Both frameworks are crucially concerned with the duty of loyalty.42'
418. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 318 (quoting Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
419. Id. at 319 (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660).
420. Id. (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663).
421. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985)
(suggesting that certain board conduct in the context of a possible takeover attempt is possible
"provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench
themselves in
office"); Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *27 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (stating that "Blasius sets forth a relatively simple, yet extremely powerful,
two-part test based on the duty of loyalty"); see also supra Part III.A & B (discussing shareholder
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Blasius locates possible breaches of the duty of loyalty even where the
Additionally, the language of
board is not selfishly motivated.
accountability located within the interplay between Unocal/Unitrinand
Blasius frameworks has negative implications for authority. The
reverse is also true. Accordingly, the analysis that follows will at times
overlap, suggesting that clarity remains opaque.
DiCamillo and Williford suggest that "while no Delaware court has
ever held that a board had a 'compelling justification' under Blasius,
there have been multiple occasions on which a board action has been
held to withstand Unocal scrutiny. '' 22 While the debate simmers over
the locus of control, the courts have "recognized the high degree of
overlap between the concerns animating the Blasius standard of review
and those that animate Unocal.'' 423 Parenthetically, "[a] judicial
standard of review is a value-laden analytical instrument that reflects
fundamental policy judgments. In corporate law, a judicial standard of
review is a verbal expression that describes the task a court performs in
determining whether action by corporate directors violated their
fiduciary duty. 424 Indisputably, "[t]here exists a close, but not perfect,
relationship between the standard by which courts measure director
liability (the 'standard of review') and the standard of behavior that ' we
45
of conduct').
normatively expect of directors (the 'standard
Standards of review and behavior may change with the context: "[i]t is
quite different for a corporate board to determine that the owners of the
company should be barred from selling their shares than to determine
what products the company should manufacture. 426 Although this
claim implies that more searching judicial scrutiny is appropriate when
directors make decisions about 'ownership' rather than 'enterprise'
issues, 427 and while the claim suggests that shareholders are in fact
principals, it fails to either illuminate or locate a bright boundary
separating ownership from enterprise issues. This distinction, therefore,
Still, under the circumstances, the language of
remains murky.
ownership likely requires substantive judicial review of board decisions.

voting power as compared to directorial control of corporate governance).
422. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 3.
423. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 320.
424. Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 867.
425. Id.
426. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 328.
427. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in CorporateGovernance in America, 52 BUS.
LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (noting that "enterprise" issues, such as what product to manufacture, face
less scrutiny than ownership issues, such as mergers).
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1. Blasius and Unocal: General Observations
Confirming that the Blasius and Unocal standards of elevated judicial
review are not mutually exclusive,428 the court in Stroud v. Grace held
that Unocal applies to any defensive measure which affects control
regardless of whether the measure affects voting rights. 429 Because of
the ever present "possibility that subjectively, well-intentioned, but
nevertheless interested directors, will subconsciously be motivated by
the profoundly negative effect a takeover could have on their personal
bottom lines and careers, ' 430 Unocal on this account justifies substantive
judicial review without the necessity of resorting to Blasius. In concert
with this conclusion, Chesapeake stated consistently with Stroud v.
Grace that "[a]llowing ...directors to use a broad substantive coercion
defense without a serious examination of the legitimacy of that defense
would undercut the purpose the Unocal standard of review was
established to serve." 43' However compelling, it fails to substantiate the
necessity of the Blasius review because the Unocal lUnitrin standard,
standing alone, might be up to the task of providing a serious
examination of any defensive measure.
Nevertheless, when the board interferes with the franchise in
response to a hostile threat to control, the trial court cannot "ignore the
teaching of Blasius but must 'recognize the special import of protecting
the shareholders' franchise within Unocal's requirement that any
defensive measure be proportionate and reasonable in relation to the
threat posed. ' ' 43 2 This analysis appears unconvincing on several
grounds.
Vice Chancellor Strine offers this breakdown: the "Unitrin opinion
[goes] even further than Stroud in integrating Blasius's concern over
manipulation of the electoral process into the Unocal standard of review
...
[the Supreme Court of Delaware] emphasized the 'assiduousness of
its concern about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of
corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders.'"4 3
This
contention is doubtful because "when it came time to assess whether the
428. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992).
429. Id.
430. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 328-29.
431. Id. at 329.
432. Id. at 320. In a similar vein, Unitrin endorsed the Supreme Court of Delaware's
"acceptance of the 'basic tenets' of Blasius ...[where] [t]he court explicitly stated that it began
its examination of the repurchase program 'mindful of the special import of protecting the
shareholder's franchise within Unocal's requirement that a defensive response be reasonable and
proportionate.' Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
433. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 320-21.
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[c]hancery [c]ourt's determination that the repurchase program was
invalid was correct, the Supreme Court [of Delaware] in Unitrin]
appeared to eschew any application of the compelling justification
test., 434 Furthermore, the court did not mention Blasius again during the
remainder of its opinion or apply the Blasius test.435 The court relied
solely on Unocal,436 and "thus left unanswered the question most
important to litigants: when will the compelling justification test be
used, whether within the Unocal analysis or as a free-standing standard
of review? ' 437 Nonetheless, the language suggesting an assiduous
concern for defensive action designed to thwart corporate democracy,
while not necessarily outcome determinative, carries a banner charged
with the power to tip the accountability/authority continuum toward
shareholders and the courts, and away from directors.
The validation of voting rights independent of the shareholders'
contract rights may imply stockholder control and shareholder-based
authority as the null hypothesis. 438 This may also be viewed as a thorny,
exacting, but rather infrequent, constituent of the accountability nexus
that is framed by Unocal and its progeny. The latter conclusion may
imply that courts are committed to the determination that directors must
be permitted to exercise the power of fiat regardless of the
circumstances subject to caveats surrounding self-interest that require
the responsible exercise of authority. Since the Blasius rule is often
intertwined with the Unocal/Revlon framework, it is possible that "there
may be no more difficult area in which to draw lines., 43 9 As one set of
observers notes, "[a] court's first challenge... is to determine the everelusive 'purpose' of the board's action .... Moreover, there is the
equally daunting task of determining what acts constitute 'thwarting a
stockholder vote' or 'interfering with or impeding the shareholder
franchise."' 440
Further, the court's concern for accountability in its Blasius sense is
extremely difficult to separate from its similar concern addressed
directly within the Unocal framework, one that requires elevated
scrutiny of the business judgment rule paradigm, but which also

434. Id. at 321.

435. Id.
436. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, supra note 318.
437. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 321.
438. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(discussing the importance of shareholder voting to the legitimacy of directorial power and the
allocation of authority between the board and shareholders).
439. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 928.
440. Id. at 928-29.
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provides the board with substantial discretion within the range of
reasonableness criterion. This observation destabilizes the claim that
Blasius should have independent significance. Consistent with this
observation, (even) persistent proponents of Blasius concede that certain
cases indicate that Blasius review will be applied to actual business
transactions that are approved by the board. If true, this implies that
there are substantial practical problems in proving improper purpose
because it may become difficult to determine the primary purpose of a
transaction that could truthfully have two equally significant
purposes.44' Nonetheless, they concede that business decisions are more
appropriately evaluated under the business judgment standard." 2 If this
perspective is accepted, it implicates and preserves Unocal and
diminishes the necessity of applying Blasius. This determination
implicates and preserves the Unocal standard." 3
Attorneys McBride and Gibbs further argue that, "[w]here the
challenged board action involves a business transaction, Blasius usually
has been found not to apply, even where the transaction had the effect
of diluting or interfering with voting rights. '"4 McBride & Gibbs point
out that the judicial precedent in Delaware courts strongly reaffirms the
Blasius court's admission that when the board recommends a course of
action that is decided by a shareholder vote without any coercion, the
proposed action will withstand scrutiny regardless of potential
constraints on future shareholder action or adverse effects on the future
operation of the shareholder franchise. 44" Hence, board interference
with future shareholder voting rights remains entirely plausible without
the necessity of proving the "compelling justification" defense if the
process following shareholder approval unmistakably confirms the
locus of control in the hands of the board of directors. This perspective
verifies judicial concentration on the timing of the disputed board action
and harmonizes with an earlier observation that if a business transaction
has the effect of diluting or interfering with voting rights, Blasius does
not and should not apply." 6 This is the case, presumably, because
control of business decisions properly resides with directors. Equally
441. Id. at 939.
442. Id.
443. Id.

444. Id.
445. Id. at 934 (noting that this situation does not raise a Blasius issue). See also Williams v.
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Del. 1996) (affirming a form of tenure voting that might favor
stockholders who are members of a majority bloc by allowing them to retain control even after
selling some of their shares because a majority of fully informed stockholders voted in favor of

the amendment).
446. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 939.
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correct, if Unocal requires less intensive judicial review than Blasius,
coupled with less expansive language concerning shareholder control, it
447
may have the advantage of preserving more directorial authority by
implying that directors rather than shareholders are the embodiment of
the principal: the corporation itself.
When courts limit the application of the Blasius criterion, it is
possible that Unocal becomes the only standard left standing. In
practice, Delaware courts have constrained Blasius review under several

circumstances, some of which are interconnected. To repeat, the timing
or the form of the alleged interference acts as an important limitation on
the application of Blasius. At issue is whether the board is attempting

to block action that in some sense threatens its immediate control, or
whether future shareholder votes retain the possibility (not necessarily
the likelihood) of succeeding" 8 in some reasonable time period; or,
alternatively, whether the action taken occurred in such a form that the
court can safely ignore any collateral yet substantive impact on the
purported rights of shareholders to decide. This latter alternative may
be consistent with judicial formalism. For example, when "the factual
predicate of unilateral board action intended to inequitably manipulate
the corporate machinery is completely absent, ' 449 the Blasius criterion
does not seem to apply. That analysis remains unpersuasive because
what constitutes inequitable manipulation remains an abstract question.
It is possible to legally recast a transaction from a merger requiring a
vote under NYSE rules, but not under the Delaware General Corporate
law, into a tender offer that does not require a vote without triggering
Blasius review.45 ° Instead, Unocal analysis (which is arguably well
447. Blasius, for instance, contains the following example of expansive language: "[j]udicial
review of such action involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent
towards his principal. This is not in my opinion, a question that a court may leave to the agent
finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and competently; that is, it may not be left to the
agent's business judgment." Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch.
1988).
448. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 344-45 (Del. Ch. 2000). Blasius
criterion applies to defendants conduct and they could not satisfy the "compelling justification"
standard because they adopted a supermajority bylaw as a way of reducing the voting power of
the minority shareholder/hostile acquirer and in doing so it treated Chesapeake's votes as less
equal than others. Id. at 344-45. The primary purpose was to impair Chesapeake's ability to win
the Consent Solicitation by raising the required majority to a preclusive level thereby making it
mathematically impossible for Chesapeake to win. Id. at 344-45.
449. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992).
450. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 934 n.38. See also Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10866, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at * 76, 78 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989)
(finding no "intrusion upon the effective exercise of a right possessed by the shareholders" where
the board resisted a merger agreement, because "Delaware law created no right in these
circumstances to vote upon the original Warner merger").
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qualified to test inequitable and equitable conduct) appears necessary.
Shareholder voting rights are therefore not formally "thwarted [qua
voting rights] when a board's action prevents a shareholder vote that is
not required by the corporate law. 451' The substantive outcome of the
board's action is evidently lost in the court's adherence to formalism.
Further, although the courts are concerned with board decisions that
limit shareholders voting rights in apparent contravention of the
enabling language of the Delaware code,452 they are not necessarily
animated by the consequence of the corporate decision when it has the
effect of limiting or constraining shareholder voting. Taken together
then, consistently with Unocal and nearly all of its progeny, directors
can permissibly engage in conduct that impairs the franchise as long as
it is done within a proscribed boundary.453
The Blasius and Unocal analyses originated in somewhat different
contexts: proxy contests and hostile tender offers. Those contexts
frequently overlap because given the otherwise preclusive effect of a
poison pill, "hostile takeover attempts often could not be successfully
pursued without a proxy contest to elect a new board. ' ' 4 Accordingly,
replacement of the board became an essential feature of the hostile
offering strategy, and absolutely necessary if the poison pill was to be
redeemed. 5 5
Given this confluence of issues, and upon further analysis, most of
"the post-Blasiusdecisions surfaced the reality that a sorting mechanism
was needed to insulate [the board] from the severe 'compelling
justification' test, situations where directors took direct action to
influence the electoral process, but in a manner that was consistent with
their legitimate authority; 456 but "Unocal, rather than Blasius, provided
the more attractive vehicle for judicial review in those latter
circumstances. 4 57 Unocal "requires directors to establish the corporate
objectives their actions were intended to serve, and requires the court

451. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 934.
452. Therefore, the courts protect the statutory mode for the elimination of classified boards
by shareholder voting even where the circumstances lead to the ultimate removal of a director in a
classified position. See, e.g., Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 346 (citing title 8, section 109 of the
Delaware Code for the proposition that shareholders of the target company have the power to
amend the company's bylaws to eliminate a classified board structure).
453. See, e.g., id. at 345-46 (focusing on the extent of the hostile threat and the
reasonableness of the response-mirroring Unocal's elements).
454. Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 887.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
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' 4 58
Thus,
examine the objective effects of the directors' actions. "
defensive
any
Unocal, by requiring the court to decide whether
measure, including any attempt to manipulate the vote, is preclusive or
coercive gives courts the tools necessary to answer this predicate
question: did the directors act with the primary purpose of
disenfranchisement implying entrenchment or some other proscribed
motive? 459
Evidently, Blasius "contained no such analytical guideline to help the
court decide that threshold issue. ' 46 If Blasius retains vitality, it should
be placed squarely on the accountability side of the accountability/
authority continuum while courts remain wary of the possibility that
accountability can devour authority. Despite obvious limits to the
Unocal approach,46' and despite the possibility that Unocal is itself
objectionable, these observations likely remain crucial despite the
Supreme Court of Delaware's recent Liquid Audio decision
reinvigorating Blasius review.
Despite its difficulties, Blasius continues to attract scholarly support.
One narrative overlaps earlier analysis but nonetheless offers a succinct
operational summary of the Blasius doctrine. First, "conduct, which has
the proscribed effect, often involves a weighing of two factors: the
imminence of shareholder action and the degree to which the director's
action precludes, delays, or renders the shareholder action more
difficult. ' ' 462 Second, "the court is much more likely to find that action
having the proscribed effect was undertaken for that purpose if the
board action does not involve a business decision, but only relates to the
governance or electoral process of the corporation." 463 This account
contends that the "Blasius standard serves a purpose not served by

458. Id.
459. Specifically, Unocal-as refined by Unitrin-requiresthe court to decide whether any
'defensive measure' (as any attempt to manipulate a vote presumably is) is preclusive or coercive.
The elements of the UnocallUnitrinanalysis therefore gave courts the tool to answer the predicate
question to the application of Blasius: did the directors act with the primary purpose of
disenfranchisement? Id.
460. Id. See also McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 939 (stating "[w]hile the cases do not
articulate any standard of proof other than the standard applicable in any civil action, an
examination of the cases suggests that the court usually finds the necessary improper motive
when the defendant admits to the improper motive or when the defendant offered a plainly
illogical or incredible purportedly proper motive").
461. One asserted limitation is the claim that the courts, by endorsing the concept of
substantive coercion, have essentially reduced the Unocal review to an assurance that
shareholders will retain the power to remove the board in a proxy contest at the next election. See
Regan, supra note 207, at 968.
462. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 929.
463. Id.
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Unocal [because] Blasius applies when the board action at issue does

not [necessarily] involve a contest for control or a defensive action but
does involve the requisite purpose and effect. 4 6 Third, "the evidence
of the proscribed motive must be particularly strong. ' ' 46' Finally, it has

so far proved impossible for directors to establish a "compelling

justification. '46 6 The latter two points either limit the application of
Blasius or hint that once improper motive is found, the exacting defense
persists as an implausible hypothetical.

For a number of reasons, this summary is of limited usefulness. For
example, McBride & Gibbs assert that Blasius-as opposed to
Unocal-has the advantage of precluding board action that interferes
with the franchise outside of the contested takeover context.467 If true,
that distinction might be capable of separating Unocal and Blasius
review while failing to explain the necessity of Blasius evaluation
within the context of a control dispute, or when the board amends either
its bylaws or its charter for defensive purposes in the face of anticipated

or actual threats by hostile acquirers. Furthermore, in its most common
circumstance-the contest for control-if the retention of control truly
constitutes a business decision intended to protect corporate policy, 468 it
is doubtful that the courts can neatly separate the electoral component
from the board's business decision opposing coercive tender offers, or

offensive proxy solicitations, any more than they can supply a bright
line cleanly separating accountability concerns from authority
mandates. Nonetheless, amplifying their prior analysis, McBride &
Gibbs insist that "actions governed by the Blasius standard are most
typically actions that involve the electoral process or the election of
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. In settings outside of takeovers, one might seek to invoke Blasius by arguing that the
board's non-business decision concerning the electoral process interferes with the precommitments of the parties; in particular, the contract right of equity holders. If this line of
analysis is persuasive, Blasius could still be characterized as a contentious and often-muddled
device to vindicate shareholders' rights to participate in an election. By contrast, in a takeover
setting, the board's alleged interference with voting rights might be simply aimed at entrenchment
and could be properly tested under Unocal.
468. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1989) (affirming the board's revised merger agreement between Time and Warner that precluded
shareholders from accepting Paramount's tender offer because "[d]irectors are not obliged to
abandon a deliberately, conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there
is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 949 (Del. 1985) (upholding the "validity of a corporation's self-tender for its own shares
which exclude[d] from participation a stockholder making a hostile tender offer for the
company's stock" because the device adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat posed and,
as such, it was a proper exercise of the board's business judgment).
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directors as distinct from business transactions that have either the
,0469
incidental effect or primary purpose of affecting the voting process.
As a predicate to invoking Blasius review, the conduct at issue must
have the effect of interfering with or impeding the franchise of the
The
shareholders, and that effect must be its primary purpose.
proscribed effect is easier to establish for conduct relating to the
electoral process. Nevertheless they assert that "a business transaction,
such as the issuance of shares, [which dilutes the voting rights of
shareholders] may be found to have the sole or primary purpose of
interfering with the shareholder franchise even through it arguably has
Overall, this
an independent business justification and effect., 470
paradigm lacks clarity although it may implicate the contested
distinction between purported enterprise decisions and ownership
decisions, even if this distinction cannot be clearly made. Additionally,
McBride & Gibbs' latter conclusion, which discounts transactions that
have an independent business justification and effect, weakens
directors' authority to manage the business.
In addition, most of the cases cited as having an independent electoral
effect also implicate takeover decisions.47 ' This raises a question
whether the motivating force was entrenchment and resistance requiring
fiduciary duty analysis or some other independent desire to interfere
with the stockholder's franchise that, in many cases, also requires
fiduciary duty analysis, while concurrently implicating the proper locus
of control. At issue is whether the board's actions are preclusive
(preventing the election of a new board majority or otherwise allowing a
change of control) or whether there is also a primary purpose to
interfere with the shareholder franchise.4 72 Further, of the cases cited for
469. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 936.
470. Id. at 938.
471. See, e.g., id. at 935-38 (citing cases involving non-business decisions concerning the
electoral process including Blasius itself, Aprahamian, Peerless, Cannody and Chesapeake-four
of the five cases involve a contested takeover attempt and an attempt to use or misuse the
electoral process to thwart the hostile takeover-only Peerless can be plausibly seen outside of
the takeover context). Always at issue in a Blasius type case is whether the board's action had
the primary purpose of impairing the shareholder franchise and secondly, whether the action had
the proscribed effect. The proscribed effect seems to implicate board conduct that precludes,
delays or otherwise impairs the effectuation of an imminent shareholder vote or severely
prejudices pending or proposed shareholder action that is not necessarily imminent. Id. at 930.
472. In fact, the cases substantiate that:
In the more typical case involving board actions touching upon the electoral process,
the question of whether the board's actions are preclusive is usually hotly contested.
And the preclusion question and the issues of the board's "primary purpose" are not
easily separable. The line between board actions that influence the electoral process in
legitimate ways (e.g., delaying the election to provide more time for deliberations or to
give the target board some reasonable breathing room to identify alternatives) and
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the proposition that Blasius "is not limited to board decisions involving
the electoral process or the election of directors," a number were
decided before and not after Blasius.473 Together, it is likely that after
inspecting the decisions cited in support of the asserted distinction
between business decisions that implicate Blasius and nonbusiness/electoral decisions that require Blasius review, one may be left
with a distinction that makes little difference in a takeover setting, but
which may have expansive interpretative implications for corporate
governance in virtually every situation in which a Blasius appraisal is
mandated. In fact, if strong evidence of the proscribed motive can be
found, it is difficult to locate an objective basis for the finding of an
entrenchment motive that is different from the4 7 4 one that is already highly
testable under Unocal's fiduciary duty foCUS.
2. Blasius Review in the Mirror of Accountability and Authority
The Blasius court observed that board action designed principally to
interfere with a shareholder vote provides an opportunity for conflict
between the board and its shareholder majority.475
In such
circumstances, judicial review "involves a determination of the legal
and equitable obligation of an agent towards his principal," which gives
rise to a question that cannot be left to the agent's business judgment
even when done honestly and in good faith.476 That contention is
fragile, because it assumes, but cannot prove, that directors are simply
shareholders' agents. On the other hand, consistent with the principalagent model, the court's contention is suggestive-suggestive of
principal (stockholder) control. While the principal-agent model
discovered by Berle and Means verifies collective action problems and
rational apathy, it exudes a preference for shareholder control with
directors acting as their trustees.477 If courts accept this invitation, they
fail to fully appreciate the so far uncontroversial possibility (accepted in

those that preclude effective stockholder action [in the typical case] is not always
luminous.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000).
473. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 938. See id. at 938 n.57 (citing Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967) (enjoining a stock issuance); Canada S. Oils,
Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 96 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 1953) (same); Phillips v. Insituform of N.
Am., Inc., No. 9173, Del Ch. LEXIS 474 (Del Ch. 1987)) ("In each of these cases, the court
found that the primary purpose for the business transaction at issue was not to advance the
interests of shareholders, but to dilute the voting rights of dissident shareholders.").
474. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Unocal standard).
475. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
476. Id.
477. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control, supra note 47, at 109-10.
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a derivative suit context) that the corporation itself is the true
principal-not the shareholder.
All observers, no matter their theory of corporate governance, are
likely to agree with the claim that "[t]he right to respond to a hostile
takeover bid is about control., 478 Equally true, the courts of Delaware
confirm their profound suspicion of board activity that has the
capability to manipulate or interfere with the shareholder franchise.
Judicial disquiet is driven by a concern for accountability and agency
costs on the one hand, and ultimate control on the other without fully
understanding that the "board cannot be made more accountable without
shifting some of its decision-making authority to shareholders or
judges. 479 While virtually no one believes that the board should have
unfettered authority, it is possible that accountability concerns can
become so prominent that they trump the general need for deference to
the board's authority. 48 ° Nevertheless, courts may be taken by either of
two complementary claims: (1) "whatever is better for shareholders at
any point in time is 'better' in some larger social sense;" or alternatively
(2) awarding shareholders more power is better because such a view is
more consistent with the conclusion that shareholders are owners of the
and that more power honors their property rights in the
corporation
481
firm.

While it is not altogether clear that a corporation is a thing that is
capable of being owned,482 whatever the source of judicial suspicion and
whether it originates with or independent of the commentators, it may
lead to incongruity. For example, overt concern for board manipulation,
shareholder voting as an instrument of undistorted shareholder choice,
and possibly even corporate social responsibility may deepen an earlier
stated paradox. It has been energetically stated by proponents of
"shareholder choice," that since "boards are self-interested in
responding to hostile bids that shareholders should independently
determine whether to accept or reject an offer ...[nevertheless] [w]hen
shareholders consent to rules that enshrine board power, they call for
legal intervention to set these rules aside. 4 83 This outlook and its
accompanying paradox may be consistent with the contemporary
478. Id. at 177.
479. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 108.
480. Id. at 108-09
481. Blair, supra note 22, at 37-38.
482. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, supra
note 65, at 564 (comparing Milton Friedman's implicit view that a corporation is a thing capable
of being owned with the view of contractarians who espouse the opposite).
483. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 475.
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perception that the business judgment rule is a standard of liability as
well as a vehicle for intrusive judicial review. By contrast, this view
remains inconsistent with director primacy, which reckons that directors
are not agents of shareholders but rather effectively embody the
corporate principal.
The Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin scaffold may either dispute or more

likely imply that authority is most appropriately vested in the directors
while providing a sufficient accountability framework. It appears that
the latter view, at least before Unocal jurisprudence took on a life of its
own, 414 is sufficiently appealing. Alternatively, one may be drawn to an

over-eager accountability framework that seems more consistent with
Omnicare. Still, disquiet connected to board manipulation of voting
rights and board veto of shareholder action persists. Nonetheless, it is
likely that the concerns about scandal, unchecked management, and the
meltdown of several large public companies in recent years continues to
ensure that accountability, agency costs problems, and efforts aimed at
enhancing shareholder control take center stage despite the actual

structure of the corporate form that confirms that directors, either out of
practical necessity or through a process of gap-filling get "to decide. 485
Operating from a team production perspective, Margaret Blair clarifies

the problem of choosing the appropriate organizational form involving a
large number of actors by suggesting that organizations must deal with

contingencies, lack
of trustworthiness, bounded rationality, opportunism
48 6
and self-interest.

484. See infra Part V (discussing this possibility in conjunction with the Omnicare case).
485. Blair, supra note 22, at 43.
486. Stating:
The problem of choosing appropriate organizational forms and rule arises whenever
people agree to work together to accomplish complex and long-term goals. If people
could foresee all contingencies, and if they were all completely cooperative and
trustworthy, almost any organizational form would work, because no one would try to
take advantage of private information or unforeseen events. But as Oliver Williamson
noted long ago, people are "boundedly rational" and behave opportunistically. Thus,
productive activity that involves many people is susceptible to being co-opted or
diverted to serve the interests of one or more participants at the expense of others. It is
therefore impossible to write complete contracts that will elicit best efforts and
cooperation by all participants in the enterprise. Productive organizations, or firms,
provide an alternative solution to this problem by establishing a set of gap-filling rules
about who gets to decide what as the enterprise proceeds. Corporations in particular
come with a set of default rules that, under U.S. law ... provide continuity and
possibly perpetuity of existence; they provide for control by a board of directors; they
provide free transferability of interest; and they provide a mechanism for locking in the
capital used in the enterprise without locking in the investors.
Hence, under current corporate law, it is possible for investors to form an
organization, invest capital in that organization, turn control over to an independent
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In contradistinction with Blair's observations, overemphasizing
purported board manipulation may conflate the embedded concern for
accountability (grounded in a potential or actual conflict of interest)
with the dictates of authority that require that directors act as more than
stewards of shareholder interest.48 7 In harmony with that observation,
shareholder voting rights implicated by adverse board action, whether
reviewed within or outside the Blasius framework, should not be viewed
as part of the firm's decision-making continuum, but one of many
accountability tools. 488 While it has been asserted that Blasius "serves
the purposes of promoting clarity, ' 9 I am persuaded that if clarity and
coherence place the Blasius criterion along the accountability/authority
continuum, it is unlikely to or may only reluctantly serve a purpose
independent of Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin other than to enhance
shareholders' authority claims. Given this background and coupled
with actual court opinions construing and analyzing Blasius, it adds, if
anything, redundancy to judicial review in a typical case in the takeover
pantheon. This weakness underscores judicial reluctance to rely on this
case. Nevertheless, an unreflective commitment to the Blasius language
and its shareholder status-enhancing claims, just like the persistent
invocation of scandal can serve to strengthen shareholder claims to
control either outside or within the takeover arena. Perforce, if judicial
reluctance is overcome and if the Blasius's criteria are fully accepted,
they have the capability of symmetrically expanding shareholder power
by constraining the often necessary authority granted to directors by
relevant jurisdictional statutes and the pre-commitment of the parties.
The rise of Blasius review, even where no improper entrenchment
motive can be found, is congruent with the rise of the modem business
judgment rule and the reduction in judicial deference to board authority.
IV. LIQUID AUDIO AS THE PARAGON OF RECENT VOTING RIGHTS CASES

The panorama of recent cases applying Blasius is not vast. Some
supply evidence of a substantial commitment to private ordering,
particularly where a statutory basis and the firm's corporate charter
board of directors, and pre-commit not to withdraw their invested capital prematurely,
or capriciously, or in ways that harm other participants in the enterprise.

Id.
487. See, e.g., Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of CorporateGovernance,
supra note 65, at 547 (noting that, under a shareholder primacy theory, shareholders own the
corporation and "directors and officers are mere stewards of the shareholders' interest").
488. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy in CorporateTakeovers, supra note 23, at 805 (stating that
"shareholder voting rights are not part of the firm's decision-making system, but [are] simply one
of many accountability tools").
489. Vineyard, supra note 328, at 1466.

1186

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

reflect such a commitment.49 ° Other cases provide empirical evidence
of the tension between fiduciary duties and the adverse effects of
dilution on the one hand, and board authority on the other.4 9' Still others
involve a shareholder challenge to a merger transaction based on several
contentions, including one that the directors failed to make certain
material disclosures and that a vote connected to old proxies required
invalidation of the newly scheduled shareholder vote.492
The last instance, referencing In re MONY, verifies that Blasius
review is most critically applied in the context of an election of
directors, but nevertheless affirms the possible application of Blasius
review to any action taken by the board that affects the shareholder
vote. 493 Another case involved a complex claim brought by a publiclytraded subsidiary against its publicly-traded parent to enjoin the parent
from selling its controlling interest and to void certain subsidiary
bylaws adopted by the parent and controlling shareholder.494 In still
another case, the Supreme Court of Delaware faced an adoption of
certain defensive measures by the board of directors, which changed the
size and composition of the board's membership. 495 This review
primarily concentrates on the last case described, Liquid Audio, first
because it was decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware; second
because it directly confronted the intersection of Blasius and Unocal;
and third because it can be seen as a quintessential effort to revitalize
Blasius beyond its questionable limits.
In MM Companies v. Liquid Audio, Inc., it is important to note that
defendant Liquid Audio's previously enacted bylaws provide a
staggered board that was divided into three classes with only one class
of directors standing for election in any given year.496 Facing a possible
contest for control from the plaintiff, MM, Liquid Audio decided to
expand its board from five to seven members and to nominate two new
490. See, e.g., Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., Inc., No. 365-N, 2004 De. Ch.
LEXIS 74, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2004) (stating that a company's choice of the statutory rule
for record dates "avoids the need for the board to enmesh itself in a record-date setting process
that can give rise" to claims under Blasius).
491. See, e.g., Acker v. Transurgical, Inc., No. 201-N, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *49 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 22, 2004) (denying a corporation's motion to dismiss claims for the board's alleged
breach of fiduciary duties).
492. In re The MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also In
re The MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (granting a preliminary
injunction requiring supplementary disclosures).
493. MONY Group, 853 A.2d at 673 (noting that Delaware courts are "vigilant in policing
fiduciary misconduct," especially in relation to director election but also in other matters).
494. Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1028-30 (Del. Ch. 2004).
495. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Del. 2003).
496. Id. at 1122.
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members during August 2002. 497 Later, at its annual meeting, two MM
498
nominees were elected as Class III directors to replace incumbents.
MM sought to invalidate the actions taken in August 2002, based on the
claim that the decision to expand the board violated principles
embedded in Blasius and Unocal.499 Markedly, the board's action
would merely dilute and not eliminate MM's presence on the board.
Additionally, since the shareholders had the opportunity to elect MM's
nominees to a majority of an expanded board, no facts supported the
claim that the board's action precluded the shareholders from voting in
favor of an actual change in control. 5°° The chancery court ruled in
favor of the defendants because the board expansion did not violate
either Blasius or Unocal.5 ' The chancery court offered the following
reasons: (1) the Blasius claim does not apply and is therefore denied
because "the addition of two new directors did not impact the
shareholder vote or the shareholder choices in any significant way;" and
(2) the Unocal claim was denied because the "plaintiff did 'not contend
that the board expansion was coercive' ... [and further] the expansion
was not 'preclusive,' because the 'choices that the shareholders had
before the board action was taken were the same as they had after,' and
the plaintiff failed to make a showing that 'the action that the board took
falls outside a range of reasonable responses.502
The chancery court's reasoning deserves additional attention. Blasius
scrutiny was not required "because the expansion of the board was
neither intended to nor did it have the effect of impeding or interfering
with the shareholder franchise, or of depriving the shareholders of a full
and fair opportunity to vote. 5 °3 This determination was reached despite
the finding that:
[T]he Director Defendants manipulated the size and composition of
the Liquid Audio board during a contested election for directors
primarily to interfere with and impede the success of MM's ability to
and, thus, to diminish the
gain two-of-five directorships on the Board,
5 4
0
.
Board
the
on
nominees
MM's
influence of
Thus, the court correctly draws a distinction between interfering with a
497. Id. at 1121.
498. Id.
499.

Id..

500. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Transcript of Oral Ruling at 7, Liquid
Audio (No. 19869)).
501. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2dat 1121.
502. Id.
503. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Tr. of Oral Ruling at 6, Liquid Audio
(No. 19869) (quotation marks omitted)).
504. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1121-22.
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possible acquirer and interfering with shareholders in their voting
capacity. As further explicated by the court:
The Shareholders had the opportunity... to elect MM's nominees to a
majority of an expanded board or to a minority of the current smallersized board. The shareholders chose to elect the latter; that is, to elect
two MM nominees to the current board. The expansion of the current
board from five to seven on August 21st did nothing to interfere with
or to change the two voting options that the shareholders had. 505
The chancery court's opinion was largely correct in its assessment of
the facts and it had a fair amount of logic to recommend it. Despite this,
the Supreme Court of Delaware was not impressed.0 6 Instead, the
Supreme Court of Delaware held that if Unocal applied, it would
require the compelling justification criterion to be applied to the rule
mandating that "any defensive measure be proportionate and reasonable
in relation to the threat posed." 50 7 The compelling justification criterion
is implicated even though the defensive measures adopted by the board
did not "actually prevent the shareholders from attaining any success in
seating one or more nominees in a contested election for directors and
the election contest need not involve a challenge for outright control of
the board of directors. 5 8 The court's invocation of the compelling
justification standard is particularly curious given the board's apparent
primary purpose to diminish the influence of any nominees proposed by
the hostile bidder as opposed to thwarting shareholders in their electoral
capacity. 5 °9 Thus, the Liquid Audio board was arguably motivated by a
business purpose that could have been tested by Unocal.
The Liquid Audio holding seems contrary to both the determination in
Unitrin that allowed directors via a repurchase program to interfere with
shareholder's right to vote because "the shareholders retained sufficient
voting power to challenge the incumbent board by electing new
directors with a successful proxy contest,"5 " ° and the concession by
courts that franchise rights can permissibly be diluted "where
reasonably necessary to accomplish an appropriate corporate business
policy." ' Both Liquid Audio and Unitrin involve a purported business
decision and some potential or actual interference with the shareholder
505. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Tr. of Oral Ruling at 7, Liquid Audio
(No. 19869)).
506. LiquidAudio, 813 A.2d at 1132.
507. Id. at 1131 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992)).
508. Id. at 1132.
509. Id. at 1126.
510. Id. at 1130.
511. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1387 (Del. 1996) (Hartnett & Horsey, J.J.,
dissenting).
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franchise in the context of a control dispute.
In Unitrin, Unitrin's directors, who controlled twenty-three percent of
the company's outstanding shares, engaged in a stock repurchase
program designed to increase their percentage ownership."' This, in
combination with a supermajority provision in Unitrin's certificate of
incorporation, "barring any business combination with a more-than[fifteen percent] stockholder unless approved by a majority 5of
vote" 14
continuing directors or by a [seventy-five percent] stockholder
was clearly intended to, and had the effect of diminishing the influence
of any stockholder who might wish to tender proxies (then or sometime
in the future) in order to replace the incumbent board. It is far from
clear whether the concept of diminishing influence coherently
illuminates this debate. Given their contrasting determinations, Liquid
Audio and Unitrin may represent the paragon of incoherence.
Thus, while the Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed in Liquid
Audio the prevailing view that Blasius review "is rarely applied either
independently or within the Unocal standard of review, 5 15 the court
contends that when it is confronted "with the ultimate defensive
measure touching upon an issue of control, 516 and where the incumbent
board of directors arguably' 1 7 acts with "the primary purpose [and
effect] of interfering with and impeding the effectiveness of the
'
Unocal
shareholder franchise in electing successor directors,"518
requires the additional, and occasional hypothetical scrutiny provided
by Blasius. Once a court decides that Blasius review is mandated for
whatever reason, judicial reversal of board conduct seems inevitable.
Nonetheless, the pickle remains: why apply Blasius review at all if
board conduct can be easily reversed under Unocal/Unitrin? This case
attempts to supply an answer by suggesting (at least collaterally) but not
directly showing that without Blasius review, the outcome might
512. Liquid Audio involved a board decision to expand the target board's size during August
2002 after MM had sought to obtain control of Liquid Audio for more than a year. Liquid Audio,
813 A.2d. at 1118-28. The primary purpose of the expansion of the board was to diminish the
influence of any nominees of MM that might be elected. Id. Unitrin involved the "propriety of
the target board's defensive measures against a tender offer coupled with a proxy contest to
replace the incumbent board." Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 82, at 889.
513. Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377-78 (Del. 1995).
514. Id. at 1377.
515. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1130 (emphasis added).
516. Id. at 1131.
517. It is not necessarily clear that the board in Liquid Audio acted with the primary purpose
of interfering with the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise. See id. at 1126 (noting that the
chancery court found the primary purpose as diminishing the influence of MM's nominees for the
board).
518. Id. at 1131.
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change.
In its totality, Liquid Audio can be read several ways. First, on an
elementary level, the case is in stark contrast to the normal judicial
reluctance towards applying Blasius. Consistent with the analysis in
Part III exposing judicial reluctance to accept Blasius in a dispositive
sense, 519 one observer asserts that it is likely that "[p]rior to Liquid
Audio, there had been indications that Delaware courts might be moving
away from Blasius. Only a few Delaware cases have ever applied the
'compelling justification' scrutiny of Blasius'5 20 and "Delaware courts
have tended to apply [primarily] Unocal review even with respect to
defensive measures that impact the stockholder franchise. 52'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Delaware insisted that prior
precedent "did not render Blasius and its progeny meaningless. 522
Perforce, Liquid Audio's concentration on Blasius can be seen as a
singular focus on "inequitable purposes, contrary to established
principles of corporate democracy. 5 3
Second, Liquid Audio can be read in support of the proposition that
shareholders exercise or have the right to exercise ultimate control as a
general matter. 524 Liquid Audio declines to abandon Blasius because it
accepts the claim that corporate governance requires a determination
that shareholders are principals, implying shareholder control, and that
directors are agents so that the decision to interfere with the franchise
cannot be left to the good-faith business judgment of the firms' alleged
agents even though the board acted consistently with bylaw
amendments enacted pursuant to both Delaware law and the firm's
charter. 525 To be sure, the board's answer to the pre-trial interrogatory
was problematic. It questionably asserted that it "was concerned that
the potentially 'acrimonious' relationship between MM's board
519. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (concluding that Blasius
did not apply in the review of disinterested and independent director action); Chesapeake Corp. v.
Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that "Delaware courts have struggled with how
broadly [Blasius] should be applied"); H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., No. 15650,
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84, at *28 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997) (declining to use the Blasius standard);
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1122 (Del. Ch. 1990) (stating that Blasius did not
represent new law); see also supra Part II (discussing the Blasiusrule).
520. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 4.
521. Id.
522. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1130.
523. Id. at 1132 (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)).
524. Id. at 1130. "A board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon
issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect under
Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a 'compelling justification."' Id. (quoting Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992)).
525. Id. at 1128-29.
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members and Liquid Audio's incumbents would lead one or more of the
incumbent directors to resign, thereby causing a board deadlock or
''516 This answer admits that Liquid Audio
transferring control to MM.
"had expanded the board to dilute MM's," 27 but not the shareholders'
influence. It is possible that the board's answer may reflect a primary
purpose to "interfere with and impede the effective exercise of the
528 or
stockholder franchise in a contested election for directors,
alternatively the answer might evidence-however poorly worded-an
entirely defensible conduct within the meaning of a robust conception
of the business judgment rule. Nonetheless, the court's holding
sustaining MM's objections may supply a basis for concluding that
Liquid Audio constitutes a judicial effort to revitalize shareholder
governance or, alternatively, simply that poor answers to interrogatories
deserve judicial rebuke.
Indeed, one narrative argues that "Liquid Audio ...expanded the
reach of Blasius beyond [the issue of] a reduction or expansion in board
size that in and of itself thwarts a change in board control., 529 First,
although one may interpret Liquid Audio to only apply in cases
involving an immediate change in board control,53 ° it is equally possible
that Liquid Audio can be interpreted to apply in circumstances where
immediate board conduct (however tangential) reduces the likelihood
that a future proxy vote or board election will result in the expulsion of
current board members or a substantial change in the composition of the
board.
An alternative view suggests that endeavors aimed at reducing the
influence of hostile firms (by reducing the influence of the hostile firm's
board nominees for instance) that minimally implicate voting rights may
be subject to Blasius review. The Liquid Audio court bluntly states that
Blasius may apply to a "contested election for directors and the election
contest need not involve a challenge for outright control of the board of
'
This may implicate Blasius analysis, when and if the
directors."531
target board acts to prevent the hostile firm from gaining a "substantial

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
change

Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 512.
Id.
Id. (quoting Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132).
DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 4.
See, e.g., id. at 4-5 ("If Liquid Audio is interpreted to involve a potential immediate
in board control, Blasius might expand only to include cases in which a shareholder vote,

in conjunction with some other foreseen or foreseeable circumstance, would result in a change of
control. Such factual circumstances may be uncommon.").
531. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132.
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presence" on the target board53 2 and thus expanding the reach of Blasius
to pure contests for control (particularly when, and if, there is some
tangential impact on the electoral process). These two possibilities
indicate that shareholders, not directors, ought to be in charge of setting
corporate business policy.
Third, Liquid Audio can be read as an argument for enhanced
fiduciary duty analysis that has its origin in and is simply collateral with
Unocal and its concern for entrenchment. Thus, at least one set of
observers validates Liquid Audio because the board's bylaw
amendments exceeded the degree of entrenchment opted for in the
charter and the firm's governance structure.53 3 If true, it is possible that
all entrenchment efforts that are not validated by the firm's governance
scheme should suffer the same fate and be tested under the same
criterion calculated to be sufficient to deal with this kind of
entrenchment concern:
the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin framework.
Consistent with language in prior cases stating that Blasius is designed
to catch even unintended violations of the duty of loyalty,534 Liquid
Audio adheres to a matrix suggesting that an "inequitable action does
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible. 535 This
interpretation suggests that Blasius is simply a species of Unocal,
meaning that where directors act to impede or impair the franchise, the
conduct cannot be seen as either proportionate or reasonable in relation
to the threat posed unless the firm is confronted with an extremely
coercive threat. Such a reading adds little to the already wellestablished Unocal framework.
This point may be somewhat
speculative, since the "Supreme Court of Delaware described the Court
of Chancery's36 analysis under Unocal, but refrained from adopting (or
5
rejecting) it."

532. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 5. The Court of Chancery distinguished Liquid
Audio from IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C, 136 F.3d 940 (3d Cir. 1918). Id. In
IBS, the Third Circuit applied Blasius "to a board reduction that prevented a plaintiff shareholder
from gaining a 'substantial presence"' on the board. Id.
533. Kahan & Rock, supra note 14, at 514.
534. See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding an
unintended violation of the duty of loyalty even though the action was taken in good faith). The
Blasius proposition continues to be restated and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware.
See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91-92 (Del. 1992) (accepting the "basic legal tenets" of
Blasius).
535. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132 (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d
437, 439 (Del. 1971)).
536. DiCamillo & Williford, supra note 90, at 7 n.29.
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V. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
ACCOUNTABILITY/AUTHORITY PARADIGM

Prior to the Liquid Audio decision, cases brought outside of takeover
contests, bidding contests, or situations where a change of control
became inevitable often returned to the familiar contention that
defendant directors inequitably and in breach of their fiduciary duties
interfered with and manipulated shareholder voting rights or otherwise
undertook bylaw changes adversely affecting shareholders in order to
accomplish an improper purpose.537 Such a claim seems to implicate the
duty of loyalty, but tangentially implicates the ideological underpinning
of directorial power that accepts the view that shareholders are both
principals and owners.5 38 If accepted, this paradigm often leads to a
failure by the court to apply deferential business judgment review and
possibly a decision to decline to deploy53 9 unless, of course, the
evidence shows that the board's action was for the primary purpose and
Alternatively, if the
effect of interfering with the franchise. 540
challenged board action involves a business transaction, the court can
simply decline to apply Blasius even if the transaction "had the effect of
diluting or interfering with voting rights. 541
Despite the difficulty in proving primary purpose connected to a
business transaction that has two equally plausible purposes, Blasius
and its progeny demonstrate that a primary purpose to interfere can be
found, even where the board action is undertaken in good faith after a
reasonable investigation and without self-interest leading to a breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.5 42 Peerless, a non-control case, and
Blasius itself intimate that the absence of self-interest fails to preclude a
successful duty of loyalty claim. 43 Chancellor Allen states "even
537. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 45
(discussing Coalition to Advocate Public Utility Responsibility, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202
(D. Minn. 1973); Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417 (Del. 1988); In re Osteopathic
Hospital Ass'n of Del. 191 A.2d 333 (Del. Ch. 1963).
538. See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 657 (demonstrating that a primary purpose of interfere can
be found even where the board's action is undertaken in good faith after a reasonable
investigation and without self-interest leading to a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty).
539. Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *26-27
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
540. See, e.g., id. at *40-41 (finding that evidence that board action, even if done without any
indication of bad faith, demonstrates a primary purpose to interfere with a shareholder vote).
541. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 326, at 939.
542. See, e.g., Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[E]ven finding the action taken was
in good faith, it constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to
the shareholders."); see also Peerless, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *41 (noting that Blasius
found an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty).
543. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663; Peerless, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *41.
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though defendants here acted on their view of the corporation's interest
and not selfishly, their ... action constituted an offense to the
relationship between corporate directors and shareholders that has
traditionally been protected in courts of equity." 544 Conceding that an
"unintended breach of the duty of loyalty is unusual," and "finding the
action taken was taken in good faith," the Chancellor nonetheless found
that the board's action "constituted an unintended violation of the duty
of loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders. 545
Before the Liquid Audio decision, cases decided within a takeover
setting as part of the Unocal framework demonstrate that ambivalence
has continued to surround important policy-laden questions involving
the ability of directors to deploy defensive measures.54 6 Although
"Delaware has not explicitly embraced director primacy," 547 the relevant
statutory provisions and the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin paradigm have
largely intimated that directors retain authority and need not passively
allow either exogenous events or shareholder action to determine
corporate decision-making. While the "DGCL is intentionally designed
to provide directors and stockholders with flexible authority, permitting
great discretion for private ordering and adaptation [it is apparent that
the] capacious grant of power is policed in large part by the common
law of equity, in the form of fiduciary duty principles. 54 8 It seems clear
that the Delaware General Assembly has left it to the courts to shape the
appropriate legal rules in the merger and acquisition marketplace during
the past thirty years.54 9
As part of this framework, the burden of proof may be placed on the
board to comply with its own initial two-part burden under certain
circumstances, or face the possibility that fiduciary duty analysis may
prevent board action. 550 Nonetheless, the underlying assumptions and
the prevailing perspective preserve the business judgment rule as a
vehicle for board prerogatives, particularly when managing the
continuing operations of the firm as well as when deciding
extraordinary activities including the adoption of appropriate defensive

544. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 652.
545. Id. at 663.
546. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 120, at 1068-69.
547. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy in CorporateTakeovers, supra note 23, at 814.
548. Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004).
549. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate, supra note 120, at 1068.
550. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). Unocal reaffirmed
the application of the business judgment rule in the context of hostile takeovers by requiring that
as a predicate to placing the burden on the plaintiff the board must carry its own initial two-part
burden mandating compliance with both the reasonableness test and the proportionality test. Id.
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" ' The ultimate
measures in the face of a threat to corporate policy.55
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation
falls on its board of directors and is consistent with the doctrine of

private ordering, so long as they comply with the requisite duties of care
and loyalty due to the corporation and its shareholders.552 It is probable
that Unocal allows the board to retain the power of fiat in takeovers,
subject to Unocal's parameters aimed at diminishing conflicts of
interest. 553 The developments in Omnicare, however, weaken this

conclusion.554

Omnicare's dissenting opinions illuminate the obvious difficulties
with the majority opinion. The initial dissenting opinion deserves to be
quoted at length because it concentrates on the actual business choices
faced by the board as opposed to the majority opinion's focus on the
deal protection measures in isolation:
The process by which this merger agreement came about involved a
joint decision by the controlling stockholders and the board of
directors to secure what appeared to be the only value-enhancing
551. There is apparently
a distinction between the business judgment rule, which insulates directors and
management from personal liability for their business decisions, and the business
judgment doctrine, which protects the decision itself from attack. The principles upon
which the rule and doctrine operate are identical, while the objects of their protection
are different. In the transactional justification cases, where the doctrine is said to
apply, our decisions have not observed the distinction in such terminology.
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (1985) (citations
omitted).
552. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The existence and exercise
of [directors' power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation] carries with it certain
fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders."); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503, 510 (1939) ("[Directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders."). The directors must also comply with the duties of care and loyalty in a corporate
merger context. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (stating that directors
continue to have fiduciary duties when considering a corporate merger). Moreover, directors
have fiduciary duties when considering corporate takeover issues. Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (stating that a board continues to have fiduciary duties
when addressing a pending takeover bid); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985) ("In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover bid our
analysis begins with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation's stockholders."); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del.
1984) (stating that a board has fiduciary duties in a takeover context).
553. When Unocal is properly understood, the decision invokes a conditional formulation of
the traditional business judgment rule during contested proceedings involving the plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction. The board can defeat the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate a
reasonable probability of success after trial if the board withstands Unocal's reasonableness and
proportionality review. If the board meets its burden, the traditional business judgment rule is
invoked which generally precludes the plaintiff from succeeding on the merits of its claims.
Unitrin, 651 A. 2d at 1375.
554. See supra Part III (discussing Omnicare, especially the dissent).
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transaction available for a company on the brink of bankruptcy. The
Majority adopts a new rule of law that imposes a prohibition on the
NCS board's ability to act in concert with controlling stockholders to
lock up this merger. The Majority reaches this conclusion by
analyzing the challenged deal protection measures as isolated board
555
actions.
According to the dissent, the majority opinion clearly precludes an
extraordinary enterprise decision aimed at salvaging some economic
return for all shareholders premised on the court's after-the-fact
conclusion that the Omnicare transaction, as opposed to the Genesis
transaction, offered a superior economic return for all shareholders
including minority shareholders.5 56 If the dissent's understanding of the
majority opinion is correct, and if the majority view is allowed to stand,
then one may logically conclude that the courts rather than boards ought
to manage the business, and that the courts rather than directors can
accurately assess beneficial risk taking.5 57 If deal protection measures
are a condition precedent for the agreed upon merger between NCS and
Genesis, such protective measures appear reasonable in light of the
circumstances."'
In essence, a process that evidently reflects a
disinterested and informed board decision reached in good faith fails to
receive the protection of the business judgment rule.55 9
By contrast, "the rationale of the business judgment rule was rooted
in the concept that, in managing or overseeing the management of a
business, directors must have wide discretion to delegate, to take risks
and not be second-guessed by courts. 5 60 Even if enhanced scrutiny is
grounded in Unocal and its progeny and even if totally independent of
Blasius, this has the capacity to change everything. While this approach
intensifies doubts about whether Blasius should have independent
555. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 940 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J. &
Steele, J.,
dissenting).
556. See id. (Veasey, C. J. & Steele, J., dissenting) (noting that hindsight revealed that the
Genesis bid would have yielded a higher economic return for shareholders rather than the
Omnicare bid).
It is now known, of course, after the case is over, that the stockholders of NCS will
receive substantially more by tendering their shares into the topping bid of Omnicare
than they would have received in the Genesis merger, as a result of the post-agreement
Omnicare bid and the injunctive relief ordered by the Majority of this Court.
Id.

557. See id. at 928 (noting that there are 'certain circumstances' where a court will oversee the
decisions and actions of directors).
558. See id. at 934-35 (stating that deal protection devices need to be within a "range of
reasonable responses" to the threat perceived).
559. Id. at 940 (Veasey, C.J. & Steele, J., dissenting); id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting).
560.

Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576.
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significance, one view of heightened scrutiny demands that the court
shift its analysis beyond the level required by a deferential conception
of business judgment toward the modern version of the business
judgment rule.561 This implies that the business judgment rule, which
requires care, good faith, and loyalty, is a substantive standard of
liability.56 2 The rule, as "so conceived, entails some objective review of
'
However,
the quality of the [board's] decision, however limited."563
another possibility exists. Enhanced scrutiny may signify an even more
intense judicial review than that envisioned by the modem version of
the business judgment rule, which may lead to a substantive and highly
skeptical examination of the merits of the board's decision by the
courts, even if no evidence of director self-interest or any other
indication of actual or potential breaches of the triads of fiduciary duty
can be found.
Whether motivated by the contemporary whiff of scandal, the current
growth in and demand for more government regulation of corporate
entities, or the court's own version of shareholder primacy, the majority
opinion in Omnicare invalidating lock-ups and other deal protection
devices implies that the Supreme Court of Delaware has been
increasingly drawn to the claims that: (1) shareholders are both the true
owners of the firm as well as being true principals; (2) enterprise issues,
however complex, can and must be seen as absolutely separable from
ownership decisions to enjoy the protection of the business judgment
rule; (3) shareholders (including minority shareholders) have a contract
right to receive takeover bids; and (4) the Unocal/Revlon/Unitrin
approach that allows directors authority to act upon a reasonable
investigation, in good faith, and without self-interest to protect the

561. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention, supra note 151, at 8587 (arguing that the business judgment rule is designed to effect a compromise between two
competing values: authority and accountability).
562. See id. at 87-88 (stating that the modem trend treats the business judgment rule as a
substantive doctrine expressing the scope of director liability and permitting courts some room to
examine the substantive merits of the board's decision as opposed to the traditional business
judgment rule which is best understood as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in
fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are
satisfied). Bainbridge asserts:
The business judgment rule commonly is understood today as a standard of liability by
which courts review the decisions of the board of directors ... the rule is better

understood as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from
reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions [i.e., failure to comply with
one of the triad of fiduciary duties: care, good faith, and loyalty] for review are
satisfied.

Id. at 87.
563.

Id. at 91 (quotation marks omitted).
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corporation must now be altered to accommodate (if not encourage)
rather capacious judicial review that allows the court to substitute its
judgment for that of directors.5 64 In sum, Omnicare seems to shift the
balance and focus toward an expansive conception of accountability,
which may provide a basis and an invitation to incorporate a more
robust version of Blasius within Unocal's now expanded borders.565

While a principled concern for fiat, discretion, and directors'
prerogatives suggests this invitation should be rejected, Liquid Audio
accepts this invitation in the context of shareholder voting as part of the
dispute over the election of directors within a setting, thus suggesting a
potential control contest. 66 It is doubtful that this approach can be
successfully limited to the circumstances of this case. Indeed, Liquid
Audio and Omnicare taken together provide a platform that is capable of
transmuting the business judgment rule. As traditionally understood,
564. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930-37, 939 n.88 (noting that deal protection devices were
held to require enhanced scrutiny in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., even though
an original merger agreement did not constitute a "change in control" (citing Paramount v Time,
571 A.2d at 1150)). The court then cited Paramount Communications,Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.
for the proposition that two key features emerge when the facts require enhanced judicial
scrutiny: (1) a "judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process
employed by the directors;" and (2) a "judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors'
action in light of' the existing circumstances. Id. at 931 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1993)). Both of these features are coupled with the
placement on the directors of the "burden of proving that they were adequately informed and
acted reasonably." Id (citing QVC, 637 A.2d at 45). Next, the court concluded that since Genesis
gave a one day ultimatum attached to a Section 251(c) clause mandating the submission of the
merger agreement for a stockholder vote even if the board's recommendation was withdrawn,
coupled with the absence of any fiduciary out clause, coupled with a personally signed voting
agreement from two stockholders who combined to control a majority of stockholder voting
power results in an unenforceable agreement results which requires not only special scrutiny, but
also invalidation, because the agreements taken together were not reasonable and proportionate to
the threat that NCS perceived from the potential loss of the Genesis transaction. Id. at 934-36.
From an analytical perspective then, the Omnicare majority opinion substituted its judgment for
that of directors facing a deadline. Failing to meet this deadline may have led to a failure to
secure any financial consideration for the shareholders given that Omnicare faced imminent
insolvency. See also id. at 940 (Veasey, C.J. & Steele, J., dissenting) ("The Majority concludes
that the board owed a duty to the NCS minority stockholders to refrain from acceding to the
Genesis demand for an irrevocable lock-up notwithstanding the compelling circumstances
confronting the board and the board's disinterested, informed, good faith exercise of its business
judgment.").
565. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) ("The Majority's conclusion
substantially departs from both a common sense appraisal of the contextual landscape of this case
and Delaware case law applying the Unocal standard.").
566. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003).
To invoke the Blasius compelling justification standard of review within an application
of the Unocal standard of review, the defensive actions of the board only need to be
taken for the primary purpose of interfering with or impeding the effectiveness of the
stockholder vote in a contested election for directors.
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the business judgment rule confirmed5 67that directors retain substantial
discretion subject to well known limits.
It has been argued that to prevent erosion of this business judgment
principle, we should be wary of allowing courts "to determine the
'reasonableness' of actions of business people or to substitute [their]
'
Nonetheless, an unconstrained
judgment for that of the directors."568
view of Unocal rather than Blasius provides the court with just such an
opportunity. In fact, the jurisprudence of Unocal has taken on a life of
its own, with the Omnicare decision evidencing its expansion beyond
the formerly compartmentalized limits in a takeover setting.569
Expansive interpretations of Blasius foretold this event despite evidence
of some initial judicial reluctance in applying Blasius.57 ° Hence, one
should not be surprised that Liquid Audio represents an effort to
revitalize shareholder governance by protecting shareholders' influence
from even incidental dilution even where the defensive measure does
not actually prevent the putatively hostile stockholders from attaining
success in seating one or more of its nominees on the board of
" ' This decision, which can be understood as contrary to
directors. 57
Unitrin, may materialize as a branch of an increasingly unruly tree and
provide a basis to expand "the Unocal doctrine to other traditional
business judgment rule applications such as statutory directorial
prerogatives, purely enterprise decisions ...[and allow judicial] review
of decisions by disinterested and independent directors," no matter what
the context.7 Although it can be persuasively argued that the business
judgment rule is designed to effect a compromise between the two
the
accountability,573
and
of authority
values
competing
Omnicare/Liquid Audio framework as a dangerously expansive
567. For example:
The only real limitations on that discretion [were]: (I) the directors should not enjoy
the presumption of the business judgment rule if they were not making a business
decision or if they were interested, not independent, not acting in good faith or grossly
negligent in their decision-making [sic] process; and (2) to be sustainable, their
decision may not be shown to have been devoid of any rational business purpose or to
be so irrational that no person of ordinary prudence would have believed the decision
to have been in the best interests of the corporation.
Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 576-77.
568. Id. at 577.
569. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932 (applying Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny to
defensive measures designed to protect a merger agreement).
570. See supra Part IIl.B.2 (discussing Blasius and its progeny).
571. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1132.
572. Veasey, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 59, at 577-78.
573. See supra notes 561-64 and accompanying text (arguing that the business judgment rule
is a substantive standard of liability and requires enhanced scrutiny).
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interpretive hermeneutic indicates that this compromise increasingly
concentrates on vindicating accountability fears at the expense of
authority. To the extent that directors adopt defensive measures that
incorporate provisions adversely affecting voting rights, courts
committed to shareholder primacy and principal-agent rhetoric can be
expected to now find support for their views within the
Omnicare/Liquid Audio paradigm, which represents the predictable
outcome of an unconstrained conception of the Unocal/Blasius
framework.
The acceptance of the Omnicare/Liquid Audio paradigm by courts
and commentators, particularly in an era of scandal, may constitute a
strikingly attractive skeleton on which to construct a basis for future
incremental judicial review couched in the language of undistorted
shareholder choice, corporate social responsibility, the protection of the
shareholder franchise, and the protection of ownership as opposed to
enterprise decisions. This scaffold may have ominous implications for
private ordering grounded in pre-commitments by stakeholders,
including shareholders. In the long-run, one might anticipate that
beneficial risk-taking will be further restrained as boards become overly
concerned about either the risk of personal liability or the likelihood that
their decisions will be reversed, ex post, by judges who fail to
adequately understand the proper scope of the ex ante risk calculus. If
economic returns can be correlated with whether the decision maker
accepts risk neutrality, risk aversion or risk taking, and then if economic
returns eventually fall within the constraints of this scheme,
shareholders may wish to look to the judiciary for an explanation. I fear
that the Omnicare/LiquidAudio cases may be a forerunner of a future
where the pertinent job description of judges includes their corporate
management capability.
VI. CONCLUSION

Let us go then, you and ,
When the evening is spreadout against
the sky
574
Like a patient etherised upon a table
We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men ....
Shape withoutform, shade without colour,
575
Paralysedforce, gesture without motion;
574. T.S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 3
(1963).
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The capability of shareholders (as a disparate group) to manage
relatively large corporations is hindered by collective action problems
tied to disparate preferences, different persuasive abilities, different
time horizons, as well as differing capacities to digest pertinent
financial, microeconomic and macroeconomic information (even when
widely available). Directors are generally seen as being less likely to be
blinkered by such collective action problems. Additionally, judges have
rightly been seen as having their own difficulties in the exercise of dayto-day or long-run management. Thus, the various contracting parties
who form a corporation agree in advance to empower directors as
hierarchs to embody and to manage the business, including
extraordinary events such as mergers, the adoption of defensive
measures, and the creation of deal protection devices.
Such private ordering is consistent with and operates as an extension
of the Ellulian idea of the living law (le droit vivant) that "is born at the
same time as human relationships. Law arises with contact between
two people for it is made for people. It arises with spontaneity.,

576

This

idea leads in the corporate context to the empowerment of directors.
Corporations come with a series of pre-existing gap-filling rules that
indicate that directors should be empowered "to decide what as the
7 Traditionally,
enterprise proceeds" to solve various contingencies.
courts and the statutes have concurred in this empowerment largely via
Empowerment has a cost-it risks
the business judgment rule.
behavior, which may reduce
self-interested
and
entrenchment
Hence, courts and shareholders are properly
shareholder wealth.
concerned about accountability. This concern escalates when and if
various possible transactions are vetoed or otherwise precluded by
board action, particularly when the board's conduct impinges on
shareholder voting rights.
Board action in this context today provides an opportunity for various
entities, constituencies (including shareholders), and courts to enter into
an increasingly intense, contemporary conversation about corporate
democracy, agency, principals, the proper allocation of power,
entrenchment, unintentional but nonetheless fatal breaches of the duty
of loyalty and the proper contours, as well as the necessity of reforming
At issue are various conceptions of
corporate governance.
575. T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in SELECTED POEMS 77 (1964).
576. See, e.g., GODDARD, supra note 167, at 200-01 (discussing Jacques Ellul's conception of

the living law).
577. Blair, supra note 22, at 43.
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accountability and contestable conceptions of authority. Against this
framework, it is possible to be drawn to the advantages of contractarian
approaches that imply director primacy as the appropriate governance
model. This position appears consistent with the determination that the
ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation falls on its board of directors grounded in the doctrine of
private ordering (the firm's charter as permitted by the governing law),
so long as the chosen hierarchs comply with the requisite duties of
good-faith, care and loyalty. It is impossible to draw the corporate
governance line precisely, but wherever the line is drawn along the
accountability/authority continuum, it is conceivable that accountability
unease will etherize necessary and desirable board discretion.
Unocal and its early progeny seemed to suggest an adequate
framework in which to exercise the courts' legitimate concern that
entrenchment might serve as a vehicle to reduce shareholder wealth.
Then came Blasius and with it a potentially powerful device for
sheltering judicial intervention: shareholder voting as a sacred plinth.
While the early cases displayed examples of judicial reluctance to
deploy Blasius, such reluctance-as Liquid Audio illustrates--can be
overcome. Recent court decisions suggests that the expansive, if not
explosive, implications of Blasius seeded within Unocal under the
rubric of an assiduous concern for the franchise can lead to the
diminution of board discretion and thus capture shareholder voting
rights within the accountability/authority paradigm. Equally clear,
recent court decisions refreshed by the pungent aroma of scandal and
indefensible management malpractice imply that concern for
shareholder voting rights provides a platform that can devour necessary
board discretion. Future cases may be required to fully determine
whether this development can be seen empirically as best serving
shareholder interest. When the final chapter on corporate governance is
written, it is probable that the Omnicare/LiquidAudio framework will
be viewed as an ominous metaphor for the ascendant movement that
defines shareholders and contemporary judges as sacred governors
worthy of directorship and the actual directors as hollow wardens of
corporate decision-making.

